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REPORT REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
RECOMMENDATIONS AND
RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE
DEATH PENALTY AND CALLING FOR A
MORATORIUM ON EXECUTIONS
Randall Coyne and Lyn Entzeroth
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The ABA Has Given Careful
Consideration to Issues Surrounding the
Death Penalty for the Past Several Decades
The American Bar Association (ABA)
is a voluntary, national membership orga-
nization of the legal profession, dedi-
cated to the promotion of a fair and
effective system for the administration of
justice.1 The ABA's more than 365,000
members come from each state and terri-
tory and the District of Columbia. Its
constituency includes prosecutors, pub-
lic defenders, private lawyers, trial and
appellate judges from the state and fed-
eral courts, legislators, law professors,
law enforcement and correctional per-
sonnel, law students, and a number of
"non-lawyer" associates in allied fields. 2
Although the ABA takes no position
on the constitutionality or morality of
the death penalty, it has worked hard to
try to ensure that the death penalty is
administered fairly. To that end, during
the past several decades the ABA has
passed numerous resolutions dealing
with various legal issues presented by
capital cases. 3 Firm ABA policies exist
governing the provision of competent
counsel in capital cases, proper proce-
dures for adjudicating claims in capital
cases (including federal habeas corpus),
race discrimination in capital cases, and
standards for determining who is eli-
gible for the death penalty. ABA mem-
bers frequently have testified before Con-
gress on myriad capital punishment
issues. 4 Further, the ABA has filed numer-
ous amicus curiae briefs in capital cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court,5 has con-
ducted and supported training pro-
grams for lawyers and judges handling
capital cases, and has conducted a wide
range of public education programs deal-
ing with the death penalty.6
In 1986, the ABA created a Death
Penalty Post-Conviction Representation
Project. Since then, the Project has re-
cruited more than 400 volunteer lawyers
to represent death row inmates and has
sought to create programs that provide
qualified, compensated counsel to capi-
tal post-conviction petitioners. The ABA's
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Bar Information Project has assisted in
the development of the new Louisiana
Indigent Defense Board. The ABA'sJudi-
cial Administration Division is presently
preparing a trial handbook for judges
who preside over capital cases. More-
over, the ABA has commissioned several
studies that focus on the experiences of
counsel in capital post-conviction cases
and judicial review in capital cases. 7
In 1988, the ABA formed a Task Force
on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (ABA
Task Force), which undertook an inten-
sive, year-long study of the process of
review of capital convictions and sen-
tences.8 The ABA Task Force formulated
concrete recommendations that, if imple-
mented, would enhance the efficiency
and fairness of state and federal review
procedures.9
Notwithstanding the enormous ef-
forts of the ABA, the crisis in capital
cases has only worsened, in substantial
part because the ABA's recommenda-
tions largely have been ignored. Judicial
decisions have contributed to the crisis.
As two scholars recently observed in the
Harvard Law Review, "the Supreme
Court's chosen path of constitutional
regulation of the death penalty has been
a disaster."' 10
U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Alex
Kozinski recently described the current
state of the Supreme Court's death pen-
alty case law:
Assuaging death penalty opponents, the
Court has devised a number of extraor-
dinary safeguards applicable to capital
cases; but responding to complaints
that these procedures were used for
obstruction and delay, it has also im-
posed various limitations and excep-
tions to these safeguards. This pull and
tug has resulted in a procedural struc-
ture-what Justice Harry Blackmun
called a "machinery of death"-that is
remarkably time-consuming, painfully
cumbersome and extremely expen-
sive."1
Nor is the criminal justice system the
only victim of this grotesquely inefficient
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and unjust "machinery of death." As
Judge Kozinski explained,
[Flully 40 percent of the death sen-
tences imposed since 1972 have been
vacated, sometimes 5, 10 or 15 years
after trial. One worries about the effect
on the families of the victims, who have
to endure the possibility-often the
reality-of retrials, evidentiary hear-
ings and last-minute stays of execution
for years after the crime.12
Greatly exacerbating the situation is a
chronic lack of lawyers willing to work
on capital cases. Judge Kozinski ob-
served, "thejurisprudence of death is so
complex, so esoteric, so harrowing, this
is the one area where there aren't nearly
enough lawyers willing and able to
handle all the current cases." 1 3 The
result is a "peculiar limbo."
[W]e have constructed a machine that
is extremely expensive, chokes our le-
gal institutions, visits repeated trauma
on victims' families and ultimately pro-
duces nothing like the benefits we would
expect from an effective system of capi-
tal punishment. This is surely the worst
of all worlds. 14
Prosecutors likewise have begun speak-
ing out against our current system of
capital punishment. At a recent ABA-
sponsored program, Ernest Preate, Jr.,
former Attorney General for the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, observed,
"[I] n too many of our capital cases there
is ineffective assistance of counsel on
both sides." 15 Attorney General Preate
publicly endorsed capital resource cen-
ters for prosecutors and defense attor-
neys and the establishment of rigorous
standards for trial and appellate counsel
in capital cases.16
In another ABA-sponsored program,
Andrew L. Sonner, the State's Attorney
for Montgomery County, Maryland, who
has prosecuted numerous capital cases,
observed:
There is absolutely no value to the
prosecution of having the death pen-
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alty. There is an absolutely huge cost in
the administration of it. As conscien-
tiously as I try to do it, I must confess
that I do not know how to do it and
achieve fairness. I wish at the time of
the Gregg v. Georgia decision, the Su-
preme Court would have indulged in
Dickens's [A] Christmas Carol and gone
forth and looked at capital punishment
previous, capital punishment as it ex-
isted then, and capital punishment as it
was to be administered; had they known
the mess they would create for us pros-
ecutors, I think it would have been
nine-to-zero opposing the death pen-
al ty. 17
In 1995, Robert M. Morgenthau, the
Manhattan District Attorney, revealed
"the dirty little secret [prosecutors] too
often share only among themselves: The
death penalty actually hinders the fight
against crime."1 8 This prominent pros-
ecutor described the system of capital
punishment in operation in the United
States as follows:
Promoted by members of both political
parties in response to an angry popu-
lace, capital punishment is a mirage
that distracts society from more fruitful,
less facile answers. It exacts a terrible
price in dollars, lives and human de-
cency. Rather than tamping down the
flames of violence, it fuels them while
draining millions of dollars from more
promising efforts to restore safety to
our lives. 19
Similarly, after New York reinstated
capital punishment in 1995, the Bronx
District Attorney, Robert Johnson, an-
nounced that he would not seek the
death penalty, opting instead for life
without parole. Johnson explained that
as a young prosecutor he convicted a
man of intentional murder, after utterly
destroying the man's alibi. Three wit-
nesses identified the defendant but, af-
ter the conviction, the defendant's
brother confessed. The brother, know-
ing that the defendant was innocent,
expected that the jury would acquit.
Johnson explained his refusal to seek
death in future cases: "What [appellate]
courts look for is legal errors, and there
were no legal errors in the case I tried. 2
B. The ABA Is Not Taking a Moral or
Philosophical Position in Favor of or in
Opposition to the Death Penalty
Nothing in this Report and accompa-
nying Resolution should be read to con-
travene the freedom of individual ABA
members to take philosophical or moral
positions in favor of or in opposition to
capital punishment. Rather, as former
ABA President John J. Curtin, Jr. told a
congressional committee in 1991: "What-
ever you think about the death penalty, a
system that will take life must first give
justice. " 2 1
C. Nevertheless, the Failure of Capital
Jurisdictions to Implement the Various ABA
Policies Developed over the Past Twenty Years
and the Consequent Erosion of Fairness in
Capital Cases Compels the Conclusion That
a Moratorium on Executions Should Be
Imposed Until the ABA Policies Are Fully
Implemented and Fairness Guarantees
Are Restored
The most frequent criticisms of the
"day-to-day operation of the death pen-
alty system" were recently catalogued as
follows:
The process of selecting those offend-
ers who will be put to death by the states
has been described by one prosecutor
as "random, chance, [a] throw of dice;"
other observers refer to the system as
"a sham," ''scandalous," "shameful,"
and "deplorable." While elaborate pro-
cedures and rules peculiar to capital
punishment have been developed to
ensure that only those defendants "most
deserving of death" are singled out for
execution, in practice those who have
been sentenced to death, as a class, are
largely indistinguishable from con-
victed murderers who have been spared
the ultimate punishment. As applied,
these procedures have done too little to
remove the influence of prejudice and
caprice in decisions made by prosecu-
tors, judges, and juries in capital cases.











Many attribute this failure to the perva-
sive influence of racism. Numerous em-
pirical studies have linked sentencing
patterns in death penalty cases with the
racial characteristics of the defendant
and the victim. Others point to the
distorting effects of politics on a death
penalty system that is administered at
the local level by popularly-elected pros-
ecutors and judges. The fear of voter
backlash from an electorate that over-
whelmingly supports the death penalty
colors the way in which discretion is
exercised by the central decision-mak-
ers in the capital punishment system.
Still others, such as formerJustice Harry
Blackmun, have concluded that the
problem is more fundamental: efforts
to accommodate basic constitutional
values such as consistency, reliability,
and fairness in the context of capital
punishment have spawned constitu-
tional rules that cannot be reconciled
with one another and cannot achieve
their intended ends. This view main-
tains that even if the lingering influ-
ences of racism and politics could be
wrenched from the system tomorrow,
the system would still yield unaccept-
ably arbitrary results. 2
2
The trend away from fairness guaran-
tees and due process protection in capi-
tal cases has not gone unnoticed by
members of the Supreme Court. Signifi-
cantly, former Supreme Court Justices
Lewis Powell and Harry Blackmun -
both of whom dissented in Furman, which
invalidated the death penalty nation-
wide, and concurred in Gregg, which
reinstated capital punishment four years
later-ultimately have concluded that
the systems of capital punishment in
effect today serve no useful purpose and
should be abolished. 23
As noted above, 24 the ABA has worked
long and hard to improve the system of
capital punishment in this country. The
ABA believes that the policies and recom-
mendations it has promulgated over the
years must be fully implemented to mini-
mize arbitrariness in capital sentencing
and lead to more rational, more consis-
tent, and ultimately more fair sentences
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in capital cases. 25 Virtually all death pen-
alty jurisdictions have ignored the ABA
recommendations and policies. Although
a few states may have followed some ABA
recommendations, no state has imple-
mented even most recommendations.
To the contrary, as documented below,
26
far from embracing the ABA's recom-
mendations and policies, most capital
jurisdictions in fact have gone in the
opposite direction.
D. The Constitutional Framework
1. The Constitutional Foundation of
Modern Death Penalty Jurisprudence27
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Furman v. Georgia28 struck down all then-
existing death penalty statutes essen-
tially because these statutes gave the jury
unbridled discretion to impose death or
spare the life of the defendant. Four
years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,29 the
Court found constitutional certain newly
enacted death penalty statutes that en-
deavored to narrow the class of persons
subject to the death penalty and to guide
the jury's capital sentencing determina-
tion while at the same time allowing the
jury the ability to take into consideration
the unique characteristics of each defen-
dant and each case. The constitutional
provisions at issue in these and other
death penalty cases decided during this
period were: the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, and the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Brief high-
lights of these key early Court decisions
are provided immediately below.
2. Trop v. Dulles"°
In 1944, Alfred L. Trop, a private in
the United States Army, was convicted,
sentenced and punished for wartime
desertion. In addition, under a federal
statute, Trop was stripped of his U.S.
citizenship because of his conviction for
desertion. 31 Relying on the "principle of
civilized treatment guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment, '3 2 the Supreme
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Court, in a plurality opinion, stated,
"the words of the [Eighth] Amendment
are not precise and their scope is not
static. The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."' 33 Interpreting the
Eighth Amendment in accordance with
"evolving standards of decency," the
Court held that the "use of denationaliza-
tion as a punishment is barred by the
Eighth Amendment. 34
Since Trop was decided, the Court has
recognized that the Eighth Amend-
ment's guarantee against cruel and un-
usual punishment is not an immutable
principle. Because the Eighth Amend-
ment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society," the
theory of "original intent" has no appli-
cation to the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause.35
3. McGautha v. California36
Dennis McGautha challenged his
death sentence on Fourteenth Amend-
ment grounds, arguing that where death
was a possible sanction, due process
required that the decisionmaker's discre-
tion be guided by concrete standards.3 7
The Court not only rejected McGautha's
Fourteenth Amendment challenge, but
suggested that identifying standards to
channel jury discretion in capital cases
might well be impossible:
To identify before the fact those charac-
teristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these character-
istics in language which can be fairly
understood and applied by the sentenc-
ing authority, appear to be tasks which
are beyond present human ability.38
Notwithstanding the McGautha Court's
categorical rejection of the Fourteenth
Amendment claim, in the very next
Term the Court considered a challenge
to standardless sentencing discretion
grounded on the Eighth Amendment.
4. Furman v. Georgia'9
Within a month of the McGautha deci-
sion, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in a group of three cases to decide
whether "the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty [in these cases]
constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. '40 All three
cases involved black defendants, two of
whom-Lucious Jackson and Elmer
Branch-received death sentences for
raping white women. The third defen-
dant, William Furman, received his death
sentence for murder. In each case, the
jury had complete, unguided discretion
to impose a sentence of life imprison-
ment or death.
By a vote of five to four, the Supreme
Court set aside all three death sentences
in Furman v. Georgia.41 As a result of the
decision, Jackson, Branch, Furman, and
nearly 600 other condemned persons
then incarcerated on "death rows"
throughout the country avoided execu-
tion. In striking down the death penalty
laws of thirty-nine states and various
federal statutory provisions, the Court
held that the imposition and infliction
of the death penalty under arbitrarily
and randomly administered systems in
which juries are given unrestricted and
unguided discretion to impose a sen-
tence of life or death constitutes "cruel
and unusual" punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
42
After Furman, a number of states, in-
cluding Georgia, Florida, Texas, North
Carolina, and Louisiana, revised their
death penalty statutes in an effort to
satisfy the requirements of Furman. In
1976, the Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of these death penalty statutes
in a group of five consolidated cases.
5. Gregg v. Georgia43 and the 1976 Cases
While holding that the death penalty
"could not be imposed under sentenc-
ing procedures that created a substantial
risk that it would be inflicted in an



























arbitrary and capricious manner," the
Court in Gregg v. Georgia" and four
companion cases 45 concluded that the
Eighth Amendment erected no per se
barrier to the punishment of death. The
Gregg Court found that the revised Geor-
gia death penalty statute remedied the
constitutional defects raised in Furman.
The new Georgia statute required spe-
cific findings as to the circumstances of
the crime and the character of the defen-
dant and provided a list of aggravating
circumstances. The jury was not autho-
rized to consider imposing a death sen-
tence unless it found beyond a reason-
able doubt that one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances was present
in the case. In addition, the statute
provided for automatic review of a death
sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court.
That court was required to determine
whether the sentence was influenced by
passion, prejudice, or any other arbi-
trary factor, and whether the death sen-
tence was "excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar
cases. "46
On the same day the Court issued its
landmark Gregg decision, the Court de-
cided four companion cases addressing
the constitutionality of post-Furman death
penalty statutes in Florida, Texas, North
Carolina, and Louisiana: Proffitt v.
Florida,4 7 Jurek v. Texas,48 Woodson v. North
Carolina,49 and Roberts v. Louisiana.50
In Proffitt and Jurek, the Court found
that the death penalty statutes of Florida
and Texas provided sufficient proce-
dural safeguards to withstand constitu-
tional challenge. The Court rejected
attacks on the Florida death penalty
statute on the grounds that aggravating
and mitigating circumstances were vague,
overbroad, and imprecise. Justice Powell
wrote, " [w] hile the various factors to be
considered by the sentencing authorities
do not have numerical weights assigned
to them, the requirements of Furman are
satisfied when the sentencing authority's
discretion is guided and channeled by
requiring examination of specific factors
that argue in favor of or against imposi-
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tion of the death penalty, thus eliminat-
ing total arbitrariness and capricious-
ness in its imposition." 51
Texas' death penalty statute was mark-
edly different from the Georgia and
Florida statutes. Rather than using aggra-
vating circumstances to narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants, Texas sim-
ply identified five offenses punishable by
death.5 2 If a defendant was found guilty
of one of these five offenses, then the
jury was required to answer three ques-
tions that will determine whether death
is the appropriate penalty.53
Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens
concluded that "each of the five classes
of murders made capital by the Texas
statute is encompassed in Georgia and
Florida by one or more of their statutory
aggravating factors." 54 Justice Stevens
reasoned that, "in essence, the Texas
statute requires that the jury find the
existence of a statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance before the death penalty may
be imposed, '55 and "requires the sen-
tencing authority to focus on the particu-
larized nature of the crime." 56
Not all legislative attempts to cure the
constitutional defects identified in Fur-
man were as successful as those in Geor-
gia, Florida, and Texas. The Court struck
down the mandatory death penalty stat-
utes of North Carolina and Louisiana in
Woodson v. North Carolina5 7 and (Stani-
slaus) Roberts v. Louisiana.58 In striking
down mandatory death penalty statutes,
the Court noted that mandatory death
sentences had long been viewed with
disfavor because such mandatory sen-
tencing practices were perceived as "un-
duly harsh and unworkably rigid."59 In
addition, the Court identified two other
reasons to strike down the North Caro-
lina statute. First, the mandatory sentenc-
ing procedure did not address "Fur-
man's rejection of unbridled jury
discretion in the imposition of capital
sentences.''60 "North Carolina's manda-
tory death penalty statute provides no
standards to guide the jury in its inevi-
table exercise of the power to determine
which first-degree murderers shall live
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and which shall die." 61 Moreover, stud-
ies showed thatjurors faced with manda-
tory death sentences were reluctant to
return guilty verdicts because of the
"enormity of the sentence automatically
imposed."
62
The second reason for invalidating
the North Carolina statute is that the
mandatory sentencing procedure did
not allow for "particularized consider-
ation of relevant aspects of the character
and record of each convicted defendant
before the imposition upon him of a
sentence of death." 63 " [W] e believe that
in capital cases the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment ... requires consideration
of the character and record of the indi-
vidual offender and the circumstances
of the particular offense as a constitution-
ally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death."' 64 Thus,
Woodson imposed a requirement of "in-
dividualiz[ed] sentencing" in capital
cases.
65
In reaching its decision in Woodson,
the Court acknowledged the fundamen-
tal truth that "death is different." Ac-
cording to Woodson:
[T] he penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long. Death, in its final-
ity, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs
from one of only a year or two. Because
of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need
for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case. 66
E. Death is Different and Individualized
Consideration
In holding that Georgia's revised capi-
tal statute satisfied the concerns identi-
fied in Furman, the Gregg plurality recog-
nized that "[t]here is no question that
death as a punishment is unique in its
severity and irrevocability. When a defen-
dant's life is at stake, the Court has been
particularly sensitive to ensure that every
safeguard is observed. ' 67 The "death-is-
different" doctrine has been a basic
tenet of capital jurisprudence since Gregg.
As Justice Stevens observed in another
case: "We must ... be as sure as possible
that novel procedural shortcuts have not
permitted error of a constitutional mag-
nitude to occur. For after all, death cases
are indeed different in kind from all
other litigation. The penalty, once im-
posed, is irrevocable." 68 According to
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Callins v. Collins:.
There is a heightened need for fairness
in the administration of death. This
unique level of fairness is born of the
appreciation that death truly is differ-
ent from all other punishments a soci-
ety inflicts upon its citizens. "Death, in
its finality, differs more from life impris-
onment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two."
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Be-
cause of the qualitative difference of
the death penalty, "there is a corre-
sponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case." 69
In Woodson, a decision striking down
mandatory death penalty statutes as un-
constitutional, a plurality of the Court
explained: "A process that accords no
significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense excludes from consid-
eration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compas-
sionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of human-
kind."7 0
While the risk of mistake in the determi-
nation of the appropriate penalty may
be tolerated in other areas of the crimi-
nal law, in capital cases the fundamen-
tal respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment... requires consid-
eration of the character and record of








the individual offender and the circum-
stances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of
death." Woodson, at 304. Thus, al-
though individualized sentencing in
capital cases was not considered essen-
tial at the time the Constitution was
adopted, Woodson recognized that
American standards of decency could
no longer tolerate a capital sentencing
process that failed to afford a defen-
dant individualized consideration in the
determination whether he or she should
live or die.71
The requirement that sentencers give
capital defendants individualized consid-
eration is another bedrock feature of
capital jurisprudence. The Court elabo-
rated on the principle of individualized
sentencing in Lockett v. Ohio.72 In Lockett,
a plurality acknowledged that strict re-
straints on sentencer discretion are nec-
essary to achieve the consistency and
rationality promised in Furman, but held
that, in the end, the sentencer must
retain unbridled discretion to afford
mercy. Any process or procedure that
prevents the sentencer from considering
"as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death,- 73 creates the
constitutionally intolerable risk that "the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors that may call for a less severe
penalty." 74 The Court's duty under the
Constitution therefore is to "develop a
system of capital punishment at once
consistent and principled but also hu-
mane and sensible to the uniqueness of
the individual." 75 This Report concludes
that judicial and legislative develop-
ments over the past twenty years have
rendered existing systems of capital pun-
ishment inconsistent and arbitrary. Al-
though the ABA has endorsed countless
recommendations and resolutions de-
signed to insure fairness, reliability, and
efficiency in capital cases, these have
largely been ignored.
II. THE DEATH PENALTY STATES AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE LARGELY
IGNORED THE CRITICAL SAFEGUARDS
CONTAINED IN THE VARIOUS ABA
RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS
REGARDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Although a few states have followed
some ABA policies, many have adopted
none, and no jurisdiction has adopted
all.
A. Competent and Adequately-Compensated
Counsel Is Not Provided in Many Capital
Cases and Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Counsel in Capital
Cases Have Not Been Adopted in Most
Jurisdictions.
1. The Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the assistance of counsel for his de-
fence.
7 6
Perhaps more than any other constitu-
tional guarantee, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is of fundamental impor-
tance in capital cases. Although the Su-
preme Court has long interpreted the
right to the assistance of counsel to
include the right to the assistance of
"effective" counsel, the Court has set
the standard of effective representation
shamefully low, particularly in capital
cases.
Competent and adequately compen-
sated counsel-from trial through post-
conviction and habeas review-has been
described as "the sine qua non of a just,
effective, and efficient death penalty sys-
tem." 77 And, to ensure reliability and
fairness, the ABA has adopted detailed
policies that impose rigorous standards
for counsel in capital cases.
2. The ABA Policies
In 1990, the ABA recommended that
"competent and adequately compen-
sated" counsel be provided "at all stages
of capital... litigation." 78 Also, the ABA
urged capital jurisdictions to establish
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty
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organizations to "recruit, select, train,
monitor, support and assist" attorneys
who represent capital clients.
More than seven years ago, the ABA
promulgated Guidelines for the Appoint-
ment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases (Guidelines) 79 and urged
that all death penaltyjurisdictions follow
them. The Guidelines require appoint-
ment of at least two experienced attor-
neys at each stage of a capital case.
80
Under the Guidelines, appointments in
capital cases are to be made by a select
committee whose mission is to identify
and recruit lawyers with specific profes-
sional credentials, experience and skill.
The Guidelines recognize that the prac-
tice of representing capital clients is
"specialized" and that ordinary profes-
sional qualifications are inadequate in
capital cases.
So that specialist attorneys in capital
cases are permitted to provide adequate
representation, the Guidelines require
that counsel in capital cases be paid at a
level that "reflects the extraordinary
responsibilities inherent in death pen-
alty litigation." 81 Further, the Guidelines
insist that counsel receive the funding
necessary for investigators, expert wit-
nesses, and other support services.
Standard 4-1.2(c) of the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice8 2 explicitly
recognizes the awesome responsibilities
that attend capital representation:
Since the death penalty differs from
other criminal penalties in its finality,
defense counsel in a capital case should
respond to this difference by making
extraordinary efforts on behalf of the
accused.
Nor has the ABA been alone in exam-
ining the critical problems regarding
counsel in capital cases. An Ad Hoc
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus
in Capital Cases, formed by ChiefJustice
William Rehnquist and chaired by re-
tired Justice Lewis F. Powell, identified a
serious problem in satisfying the need
for qualified counsel to represent in-
mates in collateral review.8 3 According
to the Ad Hoc Committee:
When counsel are not involved in collat-
eral proceedings from the start, both
the prisoners and the courts are less
able to ensure that all meritorious claims
are addressed. The end result may be
the belated entry of a lawyer in the case
only under the pressure of a pending
execution. This postponement of coun-
seled presentation of claims to the elev-
enth hour increases the difficulty of
ensuring both fairness and finality s4 In
addition, the Committee recognized
that capital habeas litigation is difficult
and complicated.8 5
The Committee's report, as modified,
urged states to provide indigent defen-
dants with experienced criminal attor-
neys at trial, on direct appeal, and in
post-conviction proceedings.8 6
3. Strickland v. Washington8 7 Requires
Far Less
In Strickland v. Washington,88 the Su-
preme Court established an unduly bur-
densome two-prong test for determining
whether a capital conviction or death
sentence should be reversed. First, a
defendant must show that counsel made
errors "so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense." 8 9 To satisfy the second
prong, the defendant must show "that
there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 90
Thus, serious errors by counsel, even
if professionally unreasonable, do not
warrant setting aside a conviction unless
the defendant also shows he was preju-
diced by the error. Moreover, under
Strickland, courts must apply a strong
presumption of competency,9 1 and also
must accord substantial deference to an
attorney's "tactical decisions." 92























Justice Marshall dissented in Strick-
land, complaining that "the perfor-
mance standard adopted by the Court is
... so malleable that, in practice, it will
have no grip at all or will yield excessive
variation in the manner in which the
Sixth Amendment is interpreted and
applied by different courts."' 93 Justice
Marshall further commented on Strick-
lands prejudice prong:
First, it is often very difficult to tell
whether a defendant convicted after a
trial in which he was ineffectively repre-
sented would have fared better if his
lawyer had been competent. Seemingly
impregnable cases can sometimes be
dismantled by good defense counsel.
On the basis of a cold record, it may be
impossible for a reviewing court confi-
dently to ascertain how the govern-
ment's evidence and arguments would
have stood up against rebuttal and
cross-examination by a shrewd, well-
prepared lawyer....
Second and more fundamentally, the
assumption on which the Court's hold-
ing rests is that the only purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of effective as-
sistance of counsel is to reduce the
chance that innocent persons will be
convicted. In my view, the guarantee
also functions to ensure that convic-
tions are obtained only through funda-
mentally fair procedures.... Every de-
fendant is entitled to a trial in which his
interests are vigorously and conscien-
tiously advocated by an able lawyer. A
proceeding in which the defendant does
not receive meaningful assistance in
meeting the forces of the State does
not, in my opinion, constitute due pro-
cess.
94
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has observed:
The Constitution, as interpreted by the
courts, does not require that the ac-
cused, even in a capital case, be repre-
sented by able or effective counsel. It
requires representation only by a law-
yer who is not ineffective under the
standard set by Strickland v. Washington.
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty
Features
Proof that the lawyer was ineffective
requires proof not only that the lawyer
bungled but also that his errors likely
affected the result. Ineffectiveness is
not measured by the standards set by
good lawyers but by the average- "rea-
sonableness under prevailing profes-
sional norms"-and "judicial scrutiny
of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential." Consequently, ac-
cused persons who are represented by
"not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be
condemned to die when the same ac-
cused, if represented by effective coun-
sel, would receive at least the clemency
of a life sentence.95
Many lawyers and judges agree that
Strickland has proved to be a disaster.9
6
According to the vice-president of the
Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the
standard for competence in Georgia can
be measured by the "mirror test": "You
put a mirror under the court-appointed
attorney's nose, and if the mirror clouds
up, that's adequate counsel. '9 7 The 1982
capital trial of Jerry White in Orlando,
Florida provides a graphic example of
the "foggy mirror" test in action. Each
morning before trial, the judge had the
prosecutor and defense attorney Em-
mett Moran come to his chambers so
that the state's attorney could check the
defense attorney's breath for alcohol.
No odor was detected. However, in an
affidavit submitted during post-convic-
tion proceedings, the defense investiga-
tor swore that he had seen Moran shoot
up with cocaine during trial recesses and
had also seen Moran use speed, alcohol,
morphine, marijuana, and quaaludes af-
ter court recessed for the day. The trial
judge ultimately found no "credible evi-
dence" of intoxication and therefore
held that Moran was not ineffective dur-
ing trial. Five justices of the Florida
Supreme Court agreed and upheld the
conviction and death sentence. 98
It is significant that the ABA promul-
gated the Guidelines after the Supreme
Court decided Strickland. Indeed, the
ABA has never accepted that the Strick-
land standard for ineffective assistance
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of counsel is adequate to ensure fairness
and reliability in capital cases.
Remarkably, since Strickland, the Court
has only increased the burdens on capi-
tal defendants who allege ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. In Lockhart v.
Fretwell,99 the Court suggested that the
prejudice prong of Strickland may no
longer be satisfied by a demonstration
that counsel's errors undermine confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial. In-
stead, capital defendants must now
"point to some additional indicia"' 00 that
counsel's errors rendered the trial "fun-
damentally unfair." 101
4. State Court Judges Fail to Ensure that
Capital Counsel Is Adequate
The death penalty and politics-local
and national-are inseparable. This idea
should surprise no one, given that the
vast majority of judges who preside over
capital cases must answer to the elector-
ate, either through judicial elections or
retention ballots. 0 2 As the ABA's Com-
mission on Professionalism concluded
more than a decade ago, 'judges are far
less likely to ... take ... tough action if
they must run for reelection or reten-
tion every few years."' 03 According to
JusticeJohn Paul Stevens:
The "higher authority" to whom pre-
sent-day capital judges may be "too
responsive" is a political climate in
which judges who covet higher of-
fice-or who merely wish to remain
judges-must constantly profess fealty
to the death penalty.... The danger
that they will bend to political pressures
when pronouncing sentence in highly
publicized capital cases is the same
danger confronted byjudges beholden
to King George 111.104
Put somewhat more directly,
Judges have come under attack and
have been removed from the bench for
their decisions in capital cases-with
perhaps the most notable examples in
states with some of the largest death
rows and where the death penalty has
been a dominant political issue. Recent
challenges to state courtjudges in both
direct and retention elections have
made it clear that unpopular decisions
in capital cases, even when clearly com-
pelled by law, may cost ajudge her seat
on the bench, or promotion to a higher
court. This raises serious questions
about the independence and integrity
of the judiciary and the ability ofjudges
to enforce the Bill of Rights and other-
wise be fair and impartial in capital
cases. 105
The prevalence of this problem becomes
apparent when one considers thatjudges
in thirty-two of thirty-eight death penalty
states are elected. 10 6
The insidious influence of political
pressures on capital cases is by no means
a modern phenomenon. In the notori-
ous "Scottsboro Boys" prosecution of
the 1930s, a group of black defendants
sentenced to death for rape in Scotts-
boro, Alabama had their convictions and
sentences twice reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.10 7 In 1933, Alabama
Circuit Judge James Edwin Horton
granted the defendants a new trial.'0 8
The next year, Judge Horton was voted
out of office, ending his judicial and
political career.10 9
Contemporary examples abound. 1 0
In California, a state with the largest
death row in the nation, Governor
George Deukmejian in 1986 publicly
opposed three justices of the state su-
preme court who stood for retention
due to their votes in capital cases. 11  All
three lost their seats following a cam-
paign dominated by the death penalty;
Governor Deukmejian appointed their
replacements. 112 During the past six
years, the newly-constituted California
Supreme Court has affirmed nearly
ninety-seven percent of all capital cases it
has reviewed.1 3 The literature is replete
with comparable examples throughout
the country." 14
Of course, this is not to suggest that
elected or retained judges universally
merit reproach. To the contrary,




















Capital cases put extraordinary pres-
sures on all participants in the legal
system. Even the most conscientious
and independent judge faces an enor-
mous challenge of reining in the emo-
tions that accompany a brutal crime
and the loss of innocent life. If deci-
sions about guilt and punishment are
to be made fairly, objectively, and reli-
ably, it is critical that judges be guided
by the Constitution, not personal politi-
cal considerations." 1
5
5. The Relationship Between Poverty and
the Death Penalty
The ABA Guidelines on the Appoint-
ment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases were designed in
substantial part to remedy the situation,
demonstrated in case after case, that
poor people accused of capital crimes
are frequently defended by lawyers who
lack the skills, resources, and commit-
ment required when a defendant's life is
at stake.
Concurring in the Court's decision to
strike down capital punishment in Fur-
man v. Georgia, Justice White concluded
that under then-existing capital statutes,
there was "no meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which [death]
is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not." 116 Recent scholarship has iden-
tified a troubling basis: It is not the facts
of the crime, but the quality of legal
representation, that distinguishes cases
in which the death penalty is imposed
from many similar cases in which it is not
imposed. 117
a. A Crisis of Counsel Appointed in
Capital Cases
Virtually all states that impose capital
punishment have refused to adopt the
ABA Guidelines. Many death penalty
states have no working public defender
systems whose resources might parallel
those of the district attorneys' offices.
1 18
Some states simply assign lawyers at ran-
dom from a general list. The result,
more often than not, is that a capital
defendant's life is entrusted to an under-
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty
Features
qualified and overburdened lawyer, who
may or may not have any experience
with criminal cases.119 Some jurisdic-
tions use "contract" systems, which typi-
cally channel indigent defense business
to attorneys who agree to handle all the
indigent defense work in a particular
area for a flat fee. Contracts are often
awarded to the lawyer-or group of
lawyers-who bids the lowest.120 Con-
tract lawyers typically are permitted to
maintain private practices. Also, any
money spent on investigation and ex-
perts reduces the fee that the contract
attorneys earn. 121 Still other states use
public defender systems, which often
employ remarkably dedicated attorneys
who specialize in criminal law. Although
in theory public defender systems may
appear equipped to provide quality rep-
resentation for indigent clients, over-
whelming caseloads and inadequate
funding frequently make effective repre-
sentation impossible. 122
Systematic studies reveal the depths of
the national crisis of counsel in capital
cases. A comprehensive report, pre-
pared for the State Bar of Texas, con-
cluded that, contrary to the ABA policies
on the death penalty, states typically do
not use central appointing authorities to
choose counsel in capital cases; states do
not assign more than a single lawyer to
represent a capital defendant; states fail
to monitor the performance of assigned
counsel in capital cases; states do not
compensate appointed counsel ad-
equately; and states fail to fully reim-
burse counsel for support services. 123
Numerous examples illustrate the in-
experience of lawyers typically appointed
to represent capital clients. In Tyler v.
Kemp124 and Paradis v. Arave,125 state trial
judges assigned capital cases to young
lawyers who had passed the bar only a
few months earlier. Similarly, the lawyer
appointed to defend his client's life in
Bell v. Watkins126 had never completed a
criminal trial of any kind. And, in Leather-
wood v. State,127 a third-year law student
was assigned to handle the bulk of the
capital trial.
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Other cases demonstrate the rank in-
competence that frequently pervades the
defense in capital cases. For example,
defense counsel in Smith v. State' 28 re-
quested extra time between the guilt
and sentencing phases of a capital case
in order to read the state death penalty
statute for the first time. In Frey v. Ful-
comer,129 defense counsel limited his pre-
sentation of mitigating evidence to com-
ply with a statute that had been held
unconstitutional three years earlier-for
the very reason that it restricted coun-
sel's ability to develop and present miti-
gating evidence. And in Ross v.
Kemp13 0-a rare case in which a capital
defendant had two attorneys-one attor-
ney presented a weak alibi theory, while
the second attorney advanced a mental
incompetency defense that necessarily
conceded that the defendant had partici-
pated in the offense.
Equally tragic were the efforts ex-
pended by defense counsel in Romero v.
Lynaugh.13 ' There, the defense lawyer
refused to present any evidence at all
during the penalty phase of a capital
case and then had this (and only this) to
say by way of closing argument: "You are
an extremely intelligent jury. You've got
this man's life in your hands. You can
take it or not. That's all I have to say."
Thejury, of course, sentenced the defen-
dant to death. 132 Finally, in Young v.
Kemp,133 defense counsel was so depen-
dent on drugs that he offered a mere
semblance of a defense on behalf of his
client. Although the client was sen-
tenced to death, he encountered his
defense lawyer a few months later. The
two met in the prison yard after the
former defense attorney was convicted
and sentenced on state and federal drug
charges.134
Counsel on direct appeal can likewise
provide grossly inadequate assistance and
escape a finding that they are ineffective.
Death row inmates on direct appeal have
received supposedly effective assistance
of counsel from attorneys who filed no
brief whatsoever; 3 5 filed a five-page brief
after being threatened with sanctions;
failed to appear for oral argument;13 6
and failed to comply with a court's re-
quest for a supplemental brief.137
b. OrenthalJames Simpson and
Other Examples
That competent counsel literally make
the difference between life and death in
capital cases is a point that was made
with remarkable clarity when Los Ange-
les District Attorney Gil Garcetti decided
not to even seek the death penalty for O.J.
Simpson, whom Garcetti's office charged
with two particularly vicious capital mur-
ders. Although Simpson stood accused
of the brutal slashing deaths of his former
wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her
friend, Ronald Goldman, Simpson's
wealth-and consequently his ability to
hire a formidable legal team-spared
him from having to face even the possibil-
ity of death under circumstances in which
a poor person would likely be quickly
convicted, sentenced to death, and
shipped to San Quentin to await execu-
tion.1 38
The Simpson case is a particularly
dangerous model, however. Because of
the exhaustive media coverage of the
trial and the great latitude afforded Simp-
son's lawyers by Judge Lance Ito, many
who watched may wrongfully assume
that the unprecedented efforts of Simp-
son's defense team replicate the de-
fenses mounted by underpaid, court-
appointed attorneys who are assigned to
represent indigent defendants. During
an ABA program co-sponsored by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, one veteran capital litigator ob-
served that the preliminary hearing in
the Simpson case lasted longer than
most capital trials in Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. l3 '
For example, the trial in Georgia of
David Peek started one morning at
about 9:00 [a.m.], the jury was picked
by about 11:00 a.m., the guilt phase
evidence was all in by 4:30 p.m., and the
jury went out. At about midnight, with
the jury deadlocked, the foreman said
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that if the court would just remove one
of the jurors, that would probably im-
prove the chances of reaching a verdict.
The court-appointed defense lawyer
agreed to that, and the juror was re-
placed. Three minutes later, the jury
did reach a verdict-of guilt. At 1:30
a.m., the penalty phase of the trial
started, and by 2:30 a.m., David Peek
had been sentenced to death. His whole
trial took one day.
In another Georgia case, Tony Amadeo
was one of three people tried on capital
charges in a single week in Putnam
County, Georgia. Tony's trial lasted two
days; one codefendant's trial lasted two
days; and the last case was tried on
Friday. These three death penalty cases
involving three young men from the
Marines were disposed of within a single
week. The same lawyers represented
the three defendants in those succes-
sive trials and received the fee payment
that was in place in that district at that
time: $2,500, plus $50 for each motion
you filed, up to five motions. That was
the limit. In each of the three cases, five
motions were filed. So, the lawyers got
the full fee available to them.
One of the things the Simpson case has
done is to educate people about the
adversary system and how it might re-
ally work, including the extensive use of
experts. Recently, the Philadelphia In-
quirer did a study of twenty capital
cases from Philadelphia, all of which
went to death penalty verdicts, and
found that there had been experts in
only two of the cases. Both experts were
psychologists. One was paid $600 and
the other $500. What I see so much
more often in southern capital cases is
that the defense hires no expert at all.
At one point in the O.J. Simpson case,
there was an 800 number you could call
to provide evidence, including informa-
tion about whomever you thought
might have done the crime. The de-
fense had investigators who went out
and pursued those leads. In contrast,
the Philadelphia Inquirer study found
that in only eight of the twenty death
penalty cases examined had there even
been one defense investigator, and those
investigators were paid an average of
$605. You don't, in a complex homi-
cide case, get a great deal of investiga-
tion done for that amount of money.
One of my clients, Darrell Grayson, was
sentenced to death in Shelby County,
Alabama, in a case where his sole lawyer
was paid a flat rate of $1,000 and was
given no money for any expert or any
investigator. The lawyer testified at one
point that he had a choice between: (a)
closing down his practice and devoting
everything to this case and not being
able to feed his family or keep his
mortgage paid; and (b) just simply
showing up for trial and trying the case.
He picked the latter, for better or for
worse-worse for Darrell Grayson.
O.J. Simpson has Alan Dershowitz and
Gerald Uelmen, both esteemed law pro-
fessors who are providing assistance
with regard to other legal issues in the
case. Yet, one lawyer who has tried a
number of Georgia death penalty cases
was asked recently to name all the
criminal law decisions from any court
that he could recall. He thought about
it for awhile and then said, "Well,
everybody knows the Miranda deci-
sion." Then he thought a little longer
and said, "And then there's the Dred
Scott decision." Those were the only two
criminal cases that he could name. Of
course, Dred Scott is not a criminal case.
Larry Heath, a client of mine who was
executed two years ago, was repre-
sented in the Alabama Supreme Court
by a lawyer appointed byJudgeJohnson,
a local judge. The appellate brief was
one page long. It cited only one case-
one which went against Heath's posi-
tion. The brief had more typographical
errors than citations to authority. The
lawyer did not even show up for the oral
argument in this death penalty case.
One would think that any court con-
cerned about justice would have
stopped at that point and said, "We
need to have the issues briefed. We
can't do our job as a court." But that
did not happen. The Alabama Su-
preme Court ruled on the one issue
presented to it. I guess it read the one
case cited in the brief and affirmed the
conviction and death sentence. It was
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not hard for the State to prevail later in
the federal proceedings. As a result
Larry Heath was executed.
A federal district court in Georgia up-
held Wiley Dobbs' death sentence. As
we see so often in death penalty cases,
Wiley was an African-American man
charged with a crime against a white
person. He was tried in Georgia. He was
represented by a lawyer who admitted
quite candidly in post-conviction testi-
mony that he did not like African-
Americans and who thought that when
you hire an African-American you do so
with the knowledge he will steal some-
thing. He described Chattanooga as a
"black boyjungle." He said blacks make
good basketball players but can't be
teachers. This was the only lawyer that
Wiley Dobbs had. During the sentenc-
ing phase of the trial, the lawyer basi-
cally showed up, listened and then read
fromJustice Brennan's concurring opin-
ion in Furman v. Georgia as his closing
argument.
The federal district judge in Dobbs'
case has ruled that the lawyer's represen-
tation of a poor person facing the death
penalty in Georgia was sufficient and
that the lawyer's racism was irrelevant.
That ruling is hard for me to under-
stand because presenting the penalty
phase of a capital trial involves present-
ing the life and background of the
defendant-who he is, where he came
from and how he got there. How can
you do that if you don't associate with,
or deal with, or like, or understand, or
empathize with people of other races?
But the thing that really struck me
about this case is that you don't really
have to be a lawyer to do what the
defense counsel did in that case. Any-
body with a fifth grade education could
show up and hear the trial and read
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion.
And we now have a ruling that as a
matter of constitutional law, that's all
the Sixth Amendment guarantees [as
representation] for a poor person fac-
ing the death penalty.
I look at the size of the O.J. Simpson
defense team, all those lawyers and
resources, and I think about another
client, Judy Haney. Unlike Simpson,
she was not the alleged abuser; she was
the abused. She endured fifteen years
of abuse and finally did what she
thought she had to do and had her
husband killed. She was represented by
two court-appointed lawyers in Tall-
edega, Alabama. One lawyer was so
drunk during the trial that the judge
had to stop the trial for a day and send
him to the Talledega jail to sober up.
The next morning, the sheriff pro-
duced both the lawyer and Ms. Haney
from the jail and resumed the trial, at
which she was sentenced to death. The
other lawyer who represented her, Bill
Denson, was recently disciplined by the
Alabama Bar because he missed the
statute of limitations in two different
workmen's compensation cases. So Ms.
Haney's life hinged on the representa-
tion of two lawyers: one who was too
drunk to go on during the trial and the
other who was too incompetent to
handle a workmen's compensation case.
There's an old adage, "You get what
you pay for." I read a piece in The New
York Times about the Simpson case, in
which legal experts were asked how
much money Simpson would pay for
his legal defense. The answer was "All
he's got," which was a substantial
amount.
140
It is far more common, of course, for
poor people to receive only as much
justice as they can afford, rather than the
quality representation to which they
would be entitled if the ABA Guidelines
had actually been adopted anywhere.14 1
6. The Importance of Quality Legal
Representation: Nelson v. Zant142 ($15 to
$20 per hour) and Martinez-Macias v.
Collins1 43 ($11.84 per hour)
In a recent Yale LawJournal article, 14
4
the critical importance in capital cases of
quality legal representation-and the fail-
ure of Strickland to guarantee quality
representation-was illustrated by two
examples:
Quality legal representation.., made a
difference for Gary Nelson and Fre-
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derico Martinez-Macias, but they did
not receive it until years after they were
wrongly convicted and sentenced to
death. Nelson was represented at his
capital trial in Georgia in 1980 by a sole
practitioner who had never tried a capi-
tal case. The court-appointed lawyer,
who was struggling with financial prob-
lems and a divorce, was paid at a rate of
only $15 to $20 per hour. His request
for co-counsel was denied. The case
against Nelson was entirely circumstan-
tial, based on questionable scientific
evidence, including the opinion of a
prosecution expert that a hair found on
the victim's body could have come from
Nelson. Nevertheless, the appointed
lawyer was not provided funds for an
investigator and, knowing a request
would be denied, did not seek funds for
an expert. Counsel's closing argument
was only 255 words long. The lawyer
was later disbarred for other reasons.
Nelson had the good fortune to be
represented pro bono in post-convic-
tion proceedings by lawyers willing to
spend their own money to investigate
Nelson's case. They discovered that the
hair found on the victim's body, which
the prosecution expert had linked to
Nelson, lacked sufficient characteristics
for microscopic comparison. Indeed,
they found that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had previously examined
the hair and found that it could not
validly be compared. As a result of such
inquiry, Gary Nelson was released after
eleven years on death row.
Frederico Martinez-Macias was repre-
sented at his capital trial in El Paso,
Texas, by a court-appointed attorney
paid only $11.84 per hour. Counsel
failed to present an available alibi wit-
ness, relied upon an incorrect assump-
tion about a key evidentiary point with-
out doing the research that would have
corrected his erroneous view of the law,
and failed to interview and present
witnesses who could have testified in
rebuttal of the prosecutor's case. Mar-
tinez-Macias was sentenced to death.
Martinez-Macias received competent
representation for the first time when a
Washington, D.C. firm took his case pro
bono. After a full investigation and
development of facts regarding his inno-
cence, Martinez-Macias won federal ha-
beas corpus relief. An El Paso grand
jury refused to re-indict him and he was
released after nine years on death row.145
Despite his woefully inadequate perfor-
mance, Nelson's trial attorney, though
eventually disbarred, was not found to
be ineffective.' 46 Conversely, Macias' trial
attorney had spent more than ten years
as a district attorney, had prosecuted
seven or eight capital murder cases, and
was partner in a prestigious El Paso law
firm at the time of his appointment to
represent Macias. In finding Macias' trial
attorney ineffective, a federal magistrate
noted that the attorney "is, and [at the
time of Macias' trial] was, one of the best
attorneys in El Paso. Thus, the trite-but-
true lesson is that 'it can happen to the
best of us.' "147
7. "Effective, "but Fatal, Counsel
Myriad cases in which defendants have
been executed confirm that Stricklands
minimal standard for attorney compe-
tence in capital cases is a woeful failure.
Demonstrable errors by counsel, though
falling short of ineffective assistance,
repeatedly have been shown to have had
fatal consequences. The case of John
Eldon Smith, the first condemned per-
son to suffer death in Georgia after
Gregg, though illustrative, is not excep-
tional. 141 Smith was tried before and
sentenced to death by an unconstitution-
ally composed jury, from which women
had been excluded unlawfully. 14 9 Within
weeks of Smith's conviction and death
sentence, his common-law wife and code-
fendant, Rebecca Machetti, was tried
separately before ajury that suffered the
same constitutional defect.' 50 She, too,
was sentenced to death.
Machetti's lawyers challenged the com-
position of her jury in state post-convic-
tion proceedings. Because Smith's law-
yers were unaware of a dispositive U.S.
Supreme Court decision, they did not
challenge thejury's composition in state
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post-conviction proceedings. The Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a
new trial for Machetti, whose lawyers
had managed to preserve the issue. Fol-
lowing retrial, a jury that fairly repre-
sented the community sentenced Ma-
chetti to life. Smith was less fortunate.
Because his lawyers had failed to pre-
serve the issue by objecting in state
post-conviction proceedings, the Elev-
enth Circuit refused to consider the
identical issue in his case-even though
that court had already granted relief to
Machetti-and Smith was electrocuted
soon thereafter.1 51 As one seasoned capi-
tal defense attorney observed, "If Ma-
chetti had been represented by Smith's
lawyers and vice versa in state court,
Machetti would have been executed and
Smith would have obtained federal ha-
beas corpus relief. This is not how a
principled selection process should
work." 152
Similarly, in Dugger v. Adams,153 the
Court held that Aubrey Adams was disen-
titled to relief because his trial lawyer
failed to object to jury instructions that
unconstitutionally reduced the jury's
sense of responsibility for its decision.154
An Eleventh Circuit panel had unani-
mously held that Adams had been uncon-
stitutionally sentenced to die because of
those instructions. Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court's five-to-four decision deny-
ing relief held that the mistake of Ad-
ams' trial attorney was fatal to his ability
to raise that constitutional claim, in part
because counsel's negligence did not
constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. 155 Adams was electrocuted in Florida
on May 4, 1989.156
B. Many States Do Not Provide Counsel to
Death Row Inmates Seeking Post-Conviction
Review of Capital Convictions and Sentences
and the Recent Defunding of Resource
Centers Has Crippled the Right
to Counsel for Capital Inmates.
1. The ABA Policy
As noted above, 57 more than six years
ago, the ABA recommended that "com-
petent and adequately compensated"
counsel be provided "at all stages of
capital ... litigation," including post-
conviction challenges. 158 Similarly, ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Pen-
alty Cases, promulgated seven years ago,
require the appointment of at least two
experienced attorneys at each stage of a
capital case.159 Nonetheless, with the ex-
ception of temporary funding of post-
conviction defender organizations dis-
cussed below,160 the practice in virtually
all death penalty jurisdictions has been
to ignore the ABA recommendations.
According to reliable estimates, nearly
200 death row inmates presently do not
have lawyers. 161
2. No Constitutional Right to Direct Appeal
Since 1894, the Supreme Court has
uniformly held that a state is not consti-
tutionally required to provide appellate
review of criminal convictions. McKane v.
Durston162 left little room to argue that
this general rule should be modified in
capital cases under the Court's "death is
different" jurisprudence. According to
McKane:
An appeal from a judgment of convic-
tion is not a matter of absolute right,
independent of [state] constitutional
or statutory provisions allowing such
appeal. A review by an appellate court
of the final judgment in a criminal case,
however grave the offense of which the ac-
cused is convicted, was not at common-
law and is not now a necessary element
of due process of law. It is wholly within
the discretion of the State to allow or
not to allow such a review. 163
Thus, the right to appeal a criminal
conviction, whether state or federal, ex-
ists purely as a matter of legislative grace.
Nonetheless, all states, as well as the
federal system, provide some mecha-
nism for review of criminal convictions.
Most states and the federal system supply
a statutory right to appellate review.
Several states simply provide the oppor-















tunity for appellate review at the discre-
tion of the state's highest court.
3. Constitutional Protection
of Statutory Right
Once the right to appeal is granted,
however, constitutional protections at-
tach. For example, states that choose to
provide an appeal are prohibited from
imposing "unnecessary impediments"
to the exercise of that right. 64 Thus, the
Court has held that due process was
violated where a defendant who success-
fully appealed his conviction was subse-
quently reconvicted and received a
greater punishment than originally im-
posed. 165 To punish more severely, and
overcome a "presumption of vindictive-
ness," the court must provide a reason-
able explanation, on the record, for
increasing the sentence. Similarly, due
process may be violated where a prosecu-
tor decides to increase the charge against
a defendant who successfully appeals
her conviction on a lesser charge. Again,
the key is vindictive motivation and the
concern is that prosecutors not be al-
lowed to "up the ante" to discourage
defendants from exercising their appeal
rights. 166
Equal protection guarantees also safe-
guard the right to appeal, once granted.
Therefore, if a state decides to provide a
right to appeal, it may not condition the
exercise of that right in a way that
discriminates against indigent defen-
dants. For example, the Court in Griffin
v. Illinois167 held that due process and
equal protection were violated when a
state that conditioned appellate review
on defendant's presentation of a trial
record refused to provide an indigent
defendant with a free trial transcript.
4. Right to Counsel on Direct Appeal
The Sixth Amendment by its terms
does not confer a right to counsel on
appeal. That amendment merely guaran-
tees a person the assistance of counsel
"for his defence" in "criminal prosecu-
tions." 168 Once convicted and sentenced,
a defendant's prosecution is completed.
Nonetheless, drawing upon the equal
protection and due process guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court has held that a state must provide
counsel for an indigent's first statutory
appeal as of right.1 61 Therefore, even
though a state is not required to provide
a right to appeal, when it does so it
undertakes the additional obligation of
providing counsel to indigents.
Where a constitutional right to coun-
sel on appeal exists, counsel must be
effective. 17° Of course, effectiveness is
judged under the woefully inadequate
standard of Strickland v. Washington.171
5. No Right to Counsel on Certiorari or in
State or Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings
The importance of post-conviction
proceedings can not be overstated, par-
ticularly in capital cases. Insofar as many
capital defendants receive inadequate-if
not ineffective-counsel at trial and on
direct appeal, state post-conviction pro-
ceedings may provide the first real oppor-
tunity for a defendant to establish inno-
cence or prove constitutional errors that
infected the earlier proceedings. 172
In Ross v. Moffitt,173 the Court refused
to extend the principles of Griffin and
Douglas to require appointed counsel to
assist indigent defendants in their sec-
ond, discretionary state appeals and in
preparing petitions for certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, the Court,
in Pennsylvania v. Finley,174 held that
there is no right to appointed counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings. The
majority stated:
Post-conviction relief is even further
removed from the criminal trial than is
discretionary direct review. It is not part
of the criminal proceeding itself, and it
is in fact considered to be civil in
nature. It is a collateral attack that
normally occurs only after the defen-
dant has failed to secure relief through
direct review of his conviction. States
have no obligation to provide this ave-
nue of relief, and when they do, the
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty
Features
Report Regarding Implementation of the ABA 's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty
fundamental fairness mandated by the
Due Process Clause does not require
that the State supply a lawyer as well. 175
Finley was not a capital case but Murray
v. Giarratano176 was. In Giarratano, a plu-
rality held that Finley should apply no
differently in capital cases than in non-
capital cases. The Giarratano Court reiter-
ated that there is no right to appointed
counsel in state post-conviction proceed-
ings, even those brought by capital defen-
dants. 1 7 7 The ABA filed an amicus brief
in Giarratano, urging that states provide
funding for the representation of death
row inmates in post-conviction proceed-
ings. 178
According to one scholar, because the
Constitution does not require-and
many states do not provide-counsel to
capital inmates beyond direct appeal,
"the most significant role played by state
post-conviction proceedings in the ad-
ministration of the death penalty is the
additional opportunities they provide
for forfeiting substantive constitutional
claims." 179 Lawyerless death row inmates
who fail to raise meritorious claims in
state post-conviction forfeit the opportu-
nity to have those issues reviewed by
federal courts during habeas proceed-
ings.1 80 Death row inmates fortunate
enough to have counsel during state
post-conviction proceedings are entirely
at the mercy of these attorneys. In the
event post-conviction attorneys render
inadequate or ineffective assistance, caus-
ing irreparable harm to their clients'
cases, there is no remedy. In Coleman v.
Thompson,18 1 the Court rejected a claim
that attorney error in failing to file a
state habeas appeal on time constituted
"cause" that should excuse petitioner's
procedural default. Earlier, the Court
had held that attorney error can be
"cause" only if it constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel violative of the
Sixth Amendment. Because there is no
constitutional right to an attorney in
state post-conviction proceedings, there
can be no claim of constitutionally inef-
fective assistance of counsel in those
proceedings.
Thus far the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue of whether a
death row inmate has a constitutional
right to appointed counsel during fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings. In all
likelihood, the Court would draw upon
Moffitt, Finley, and Giarrantano and hold
that no such constitutional right exists.
Lower federal courts have held that the
Constitution does not provide the right
to counsel in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.18 2 Nonetheless, capital defen-
dants currently do have a statutory right
to the assistance of counsel in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. 183
6. Defunding of the Death Penalty
Resource Centers
One critical recommendation, issued
by the ABA Task Force, is that death
penalty jurisdictions "should establish
and fund organizations to recruit, select,
train, monitor, support, and assist attor-
neys involved at all stages of capital
litigation and, if necessary, to participate
in the trial of such cases." 184 Virtually
nothing has been done to implement
this recommendation at trial and on
direct appeal. However, in 1988, acting
under the authority of the Criminal
Justice Act, 185 the federaljudiciary estab-
lished twenty post-conviction defender
organizations (PCDOs) to help alleviate
the crisis in counsel facing capital in-
mates in state post-conviction and fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings.18 6
The PCDOs, also known as Resource
Centers, were extremely effective. Chief
Judge Tjoflat of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, testi-
fying before the ABA Task Force, called
the Resource Centers "indispensable." 187
Similarly, Judge Arthur L. Alarcon of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
wrote that these organizations were "criti-
cal" to the efficient processing of capital
cases.188 The Cox Subcommittee on
Death Penalty Representation described
























the work of the Resource Centers as
follows:
Resource centers have both facilitated
the provision of counsel to death sen-
tenced inmates and enhanced the qual-
ity of representation. The promise of
expert advice and assistance from re-
source center attorneys has encour-
aged private counsel to provide repre-
sentation for death sentenced inmates.
Private lawyers who communicated with
the subcommittee almost uniformly ex-
pressed the view that they would not
willingly represent a death sentenced
inmate without the assistance of a re-
source center or similar organization.
State and federal judges agreed that
resource center assistance was critical
to the recruitment of private attorneys
to represent death sentenced inmates.
Furthermore, resource centers employ
staff who have developed significant
legal expertise in the fields of capital
punishment and habeas corpus law.
This expertise assists private appointed
counsel in providing quality representa-
tion. Resource centers can also en-
hance the quality of representation by
providing continuity of counsel over
the course of the case.'8 9
Although the full Judicial Conference
subcommittee found that PCDOs facili-
tated the provision of counsel to capital
inmates, "enhanced the quality of repre-
sentation and-by offering expert ad-
vice and assistance-encouraged private
counsel to provide capital representa-
tion ... the 104th Congress decided to
kill them."1 9
0
Supreme CourtJustices, lower federal
court judges, state judiciaries, state bar
associations, and the ABA spoke out in
support of the Resource Centers. 9 1 In-
deed, former ABA President George E.
Bushell publicly denounced the effort to
defund the Resource Centers.192 None-
theless, the 104th Congress defunded
them all. 19
3
If Congress had hoped to save money
by defunding the Resource Centers, it is
likely to be disappointed. The average
salary of a PDCO staff attorney was
$30,000 per year, which translates to an
average hourly wage of $55. Court-
appointed private attorneys in federal
habeas corpus cases earn an average
hourly wage of $138.194 Richard A. Ar-
nold, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
and head of the budget committee of
the Judicial Conference of the United
States, has put the increased cost in
perspective. According to Chief Judge
Arnold's estimates, the cost of represent-
ing death row inmates without PCDOs
will skyrocket in fiscal 1996, increasing
somewhere between 75 and 158 percent.
Whereas PCDOs cost taxpayers $21.2
million, representation of death row in-
mates without PCDOs will require be-
tween $37.2 and $51.1 million. 195
Economic projections capture only a
fraction of the costly consequences of
defunding. Earlier this year, a report of
the Bar of the City of New York assessed
the likely impact of Congress' refusal to
fund PCDOs:
The withdrawal of PCDO funding could
not have come at a worse time. At the
creation of the PCDOs in 1988, the
,death row population was 2,124. Seven
years later, the death row population
has increased by more than 43% to
more than 3,040. More than three-
quarters of death row inmates' cases
have yet to reach the federal courts.
There, and in the state courts, new
confusion and greater log jams will
follow PDCO funding.196
C. Far From Embracing the
Recommendations of the ABA, the Supreme
Court Has Pushed Capital Habeas
Jurisprudence in the Opposite Direction and
Congress Has Eviscerated the Great Writ,
Ensuring Less Fairness and Heightening
the Risk of Error in Capital Cases
As detailed below, the ABA in recent
years has devoted enormous resources
to studying habeas corpus in death pen-
alty cases. No other organization has
monitored habeas corpus more closely,
developed greater expertise about the
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty
Features
Report Regarding Implementation of the ABA's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty
strengths and weaknesses of habeas cor-
pus, or offered more detailed recommen-
dations for habeas reform.
In 1981, the ABA publicly opposed
three bills then pending in Congress
that would have drastically restricted the
ability of federal courts to adjudicate
claims in habeas corpus.1 97 At the same
time, the ABA proposed alternative ha-
beas reforms, designed to expedite ha-
beas litigation, while acknowledging the
authority and responsibility of federal
courts to exercise independent judg-
ment on the merits of constitutional
claims. 19
8
In 1988, an ABA Task Force began a
year-long project of gathering informa-
tion from judges, prosecutors, and de-
fense attorneys on how to improve a
system virtually everyone agreed was un-
satisfactory.1 99 In a comprehensive re-
port, the Task Force concluded that "the
post-conviction process of reviewing capi-
tal convictions and sentences is, on the
one hand, too long and too slow and, on
the other hand, susceptible to unfair
outcomes due to the inadequate presen-
tation of constitutional issues." 200 Accord-
ingly, the Task Force proposed substitut-
ing a new process that would "achieve
greater fairness and facilitate rational
review." 201 The ABA endorsed this new
process and adopted the set of sixteen
recommendations contained in the Task
Force report.20 2
Far from embracing the recommenda-
tions of the ABA Task Force, capital
jurisdictions have essentially ignored
them. Worse, recent Supreme Court de-
cisions have pushed the law further in
the opposite direction. There is no rea-
son to believe that the situation will
improve. To the contrary, recent legisla-
tion is certain to make matters signifi-
cantly worse.203
1. Overview of The Great Writ204
In 1996, Congress gutted the writ of
habeas corpus by placing limitations on
the remedy that sweep even further than
the rigid restrictions adopted by the
Supreme Court during the past few
years.20
5
The writ of habeas corpus traces its
roots to England and entered the fabric
of American law during the colonial
period. 20 6 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized "the extraordinary prestige of the
Great Writ, ' 20 7 which Blackstone de-
scribed as "the most celebrated writ in
the English law." 20 8
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution
reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require
it."' 20 9 Habeas corpus derives its name
from Latin and means "have the body."
As initially developed sometime before
the thirteenth century, the writ was a
form of mesne process by which courts
compelled the attendance of parties
whose presence would facilitate their
proceedings. It was not until the mid-
fourteenth century that it came to be
used as an independent proceeding
designed to challenge illegal detention.
The subsequent characterization of ha-
beas corpus as the Great Writ of Lib-
erty-the alleged procedural underpin-
ning of the guarantees of the Magna
Carta-stemmed primarily from battles
fought in establishing its effectiveness
against imprisonment by the Crown
withoutjudicial authorization. 210
In the United States, the very first
Congress expressly included the writ of
habeas corpus in the first Judiciary Act,
passed in 1789. According to that Act:
[T] he several courts of the United States
shall have the power to issue writs of...
habeas corpus which may be necessary
for the exercise of their respective juris-
dictions, and agreeable to the prin-
ciples and usages of law. And that either
the justices of the Supreme Court, as
well as judges of the District Courts,
shall have power to grant writs of habeas
corpus for the purpose of inquiry into
the cause of commitment.2"
Originally, the writ only extended to
federal prisoners: those in custody "un-















der or by color of the authority of the
United States." In Ex Parte Dorr,2 12 the
Supreme Court held that the common
law writ of habeas corpus did not extend
to state prisoners. 213 In 1867-the year
the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted-Congress passed a new Judi-
ciary Act. Its provisions allowed state
prisoners "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States"
to challenge their confinement in fed-
eral court.2 14 Ex Parte Dorr was thus
overruled.
Prior to 1915, courts limited the writ's
availability by restricting its use to state
prisoners who had been sentenced by a
court lacking proper jurisdiction. How-
ever, in Frank v. Mangum,2 15 the Court
took a more expansive approach to the
writ:
Frank v. Mangum, the Supreme Court's
first major twentieth century habeas
corpus decision, held that the habeas
remedy should be provided whenever
the state, "supplying the corrective pro-
cess. ... deprives the accused of life or
liberty without due process of law." If
the state did not provide an effective
remedy to vindicate federal constitu-
tional rights, the federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions.
Nearly forty years later, in Brown v.
Allen, the Court made an even more
significant pronouncement, holding
that, assuming state remedies have been
exhausted, a state prisoner can petition
a federal court for adjudication of a
constitutional claim even when the state
corrective process is adequate.
From Brown until the 1970s, the Court
continued to support an expansive view
of the writ, to the point where it be-
came available to virtually any state
prisoner with a constitutional claim
who had not deliberately bypassed the
state corrective process. But since the
mid-1970s, the Court, while not over-
turning Brown, has moved from heavy
reliance on habeas corpus as a means of
reviewing state court decisions to a
preference for state resolution of most
constitutional conflicts arising in crimi-
nal cases .... 216
The Court-led retreat from an expan-
sive view of the writ continues to gener-
ate significant debate. As a practical
matter, this retreat has had an impact in
two areas: first, the type of substantive
claim a state criminal defendant may
bring in federal court; and second, the
extent to which habeas relief may be
foreclosed due to a criminal defendant's
failure to adequately litigate his claims in
state court or comply with other proce-
dural requirements.
The retreat from an expansive view of
the writ is a result of at least three
factors. First, the Supreme Court ex-
presses greater faith in the capabilities of
state courts. Second, the Supreme Court
hopes to promote comity between the
federal and state systems by showing
greater respect for, and thus increased
deference to, the decisions of state
courts. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tant, the Court repeatedly emphasizes
the need for finality in the judicial pro-
cess and the burden that habeas peti-
tions place on federal courts.2 17 Accord-
ing to a majority opinion authored by
Justice Anthony Kennedy,
Finality has a special importance in the
context of a federal attack on a state
conviction. Reexamination of state con-
victions on federal habeas "frustrate [s]
... 'both the States' sovereign power to
punish offenders and their good-faith
attempts to honor constitutional
rights.' "Our federal system recognizes
the independent power of a State to
articulate societal norms through crimi-
nal law; but the power of a State to pass
laws means little if the State cannot
enforce them.
Habeas review extracts further costs.
Federal collateral litigation places a
heavy burden on scarce federal judicial
resources, and threatens the capacity of
the system to resolve primary dis-
putes.218
In this regard, from time to time, various
Justices have expressed a desire to
shorten the appeals process for death
row inmates and to increase the pace of
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executions, in hopes of achieving some
deterrent effect.
2. Forty Percent Reversal Rate
in Capital Cases
More than forty years ago, Justice
Jackson complained about the "flood"
of "stale, frivolous and repetitious [ha-
beas] petitions." 219 JusticeJackson wrote,
It must prejudice the occasional merito-
rious application to be buried in a flood
of worthless ones. He who must search
a haystack for a needle is likely to end
up with the attitude that the needle is
not worth the search.220
Contrary to Justice Jackson's assess-
ment, meritorious habeas petitions are
anything but "occasional," particularly
in capital cases. Recently, a Supreme
Courtjustice described the error rate in
state capital cases as "staggering."
' 221
Forty-six percent of state capital cases
reviewed in federal habeas corpus be-
tween 1976 and 1991 were found to
contain harmful constitutional error.
222
This alarming rate has only decreased
slightly, and has hovered at around forty
percent for the past several years.
223
And, of course, the forty percent reversal
rate includes at least some persons con-
demned to die who were later deter-
mined to be actually innocent.
224
Nor can the federal constitutional vio-
lations that led the surprisingly high
success rate for death row inmates be
fairly characterized as "technicalities." 225
Here are some examples:
A mentally deficient man gave the
police two vastly different statements
during forty-two hours of uncoun-
seled questioning. The later of the
two confessions used words beyond
the defendant's capability and, un-
like the first confession, distinctly
recited facts that qualified the defen-
dant for the death penalty. The court
noted that the interrogators' zealous
intent to secure a statement that
would qualify the defendant for the
death penalty, even though the previ-
ous statement was sufficient to con-
vict of the crime accused, and the
absence of any indication that the
defendant was made aware of the
significance of the changes in the
statement, created a suggestive envi-
ronment that rendered the second
statement involuntary. [Jurek v. Es-
telle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981).]
" The grand jury that indicted the
defendant was selected in a process
that systematically excluded African
Americans. [Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254 (1986).]
" The prosecution knowingly presented
misleading evidence by using the
same expert witness to testify at the
defendant's trial that he must have
been the sole triggerman, when that
expert had previously testified at the
codefendant's trial that the codefen-
dant must have been the sole trigger-
man. [ Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670
(11th Cir. 1987), affg 667 F. Supp.
1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986).]
" The prosecution withheld its most
crucial witness' prior statement,
which corroborated evidence favor-
able to the defendant and would
have been material in challenging
the witness' trial testimony. [Carter v.
Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988)
(jury sentenced defendant to life on
three first degree murder charges).]
" The prosecutor withheld investiga-
tive reports containing substantial ev-
idence indicating that someone other
than the defendant may have commit-
ted the murder. [Bowen v. Maynard,
799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 962 (1986).]
" The prosecutor deliberately withheld
the fact that his chief witness had
received a deal for his trial testimony,
and improperly misled the jury by
stating in his closing argument that
the absence of such a deal favorably
reflected upon the veracity of the
witness. [Brown v. Wainwright, 785
F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986).]































" The prosecution suppressed evidence
showing that the defendant did not
commit the killing. [Chaney v. Brown,
730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1090 (1984).]
" The defendant was insane at the time
of the trial and thus was not compe-
tent to assist his attorney. [Wallace v.
Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102 (llth Cir. 1985).]
After the federal court ordered a
retrial and the defendant was re-
stored to sanity, he was acquitted.
" The district attorney devised a secret
scheme by which he got the jury
commissioners to underrepresent Af-
rican-Americans and women. [Amadeo
v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).]
" Massive pretrial publicity in a small
town compromised nearly all jurors,
many of whom had attended the
victims' funeral. [Coleman v. Kemp,
778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).]
" The local sheriff handpicked thejury
in a case involving the murder of a
police officer. [ Thompson v. White, 680
F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1177 (1983).]
" Thejudge's charge to the jury uncon-
stitutionally placed on the defendant
the burden of proof on a key element
of the alleged crime. [Francis v. Frank-
lin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).]
" The prosecutor based his argument
in favor of a death sentence on prior
felony convictions that he knew, al-
though stipulated to by defense coun-
sel, did not exist. [Lewis v. Lane, 832
F.2d 1446 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 829 (1988).]
" The defendant was sentenced to
death by ajury that had been uncon-
stitutionally instructed that it could
not consider his brain damage, his
full cooperation with the police, or
his favorable prospect for rehabilita-
tion as mitigating factors. [Hitchcock
v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).]
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" The jury was unconstitutionally in-
structed in a way that prevented it
from considering the defendant's
mental retardation as a factor that
would support a sentence other than
death. [Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989).]
" The prosecutor inaccurately told the
jury that a verdict of death would not
be final because the appellate courts
would correct any mistakes it made.
[ Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621,624-29
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
930 (1987).]
" The defendant's attorney failed to
inform the jury (which convicted
and sentenced the defendant to
death) that the State's only witness-
the admitted killer, who testified in
return for a lesser sentence-did not
link the defendant to the murder in
his detailed confession to police.
[Smith v. Wainwright, 799 E2d 1442
(1lth Cir. 1986).]
" Defense counsel filed no pretrial mo-
tions, did not try to locate any de-
fense witnesses, did not interview the
defendant's family or the State's wit-
nesses, did not visit the crime scene,
failed to use possibly exculpatory evi-
dence available from the State's scien-
tific tests, and failed to seek a new
trial after evidence emerged that the
victims were alive after the last time
that the defendant could have been
in contact with them. [House v. Balk-
com, 725 E2d 608 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984).]
" Defense counsel failed to present
significant evidence to the jury con-
cerning the defendant's retardation,
limited education and "poverty-
stricken socioeconomic back-
ground"-evidence that might have
persuaded the jury to impose a sen-
tence other than death. [Cunning-
ham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir.
1991).]
" Neither defense lawyer conducted
any investigation seeking evidence
that might persuade the jury not to
impose the death sentence, because
"[e]ach lawyer ... believed ... the
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other was responsible for preparing
the penalty phase." [Harris v. Dugger,
874 F2d 756, 763 (llth Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1011 (1990).]
* Defense counsel did not investigate
or otherwise prepare for the capital
sentencing hearing because he was
confident that he could negotiate a
sentence other than death. [Osborn v.
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 624-30 (10th
Cir. 1988).]
* Defense counsel failed to bring to
the jury's attention evidence relating
to the defendant's mental retarda-
tion, the fact that his IQ was below
41, that he was only seventeen years
old at the time of the crime, and was
not proven to have had any intent or
played any role in the homicide.
[Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1087 (1987).]
* Defendant was denied the benefit of
the presentation of crucial mitigat-
ing evidence by the defense counsel's
failure to conduct a reasonable inves-
tigation to uncover information re-
garding defendant's mental retarda-
tion and psychiatric history. [Baxter v.
Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 385 (1995).]
* The prosecutor's deliberate and re-
peated misrepresentations before the
jury, directly "aimed at discrediting
the core of the defense," rendered
defendant's trial fundamentally un-
fair. [Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1550
(11th Cir. 1994).]
* The prosecution withheld informa-
tion that three individuals, known to
be associates in criminal activity, had
previously been identified as being at
the scene of the crime, that one of
the individuals identified had con-
fessed committing the crime to his
cellmate, that the same individual
was positively identified as having
forged endorsement on the money
orders taken during commission of
the crime, and that the same indi-
vidual had committed manslaughter
by using a weapon of a similar caliber
as the one used in commission of the
crime. [Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d
1508, 1516-22 (10th Cir. 1995).]
" Defense counsel's failure to order a
mental evaluation prevented the pre-
sentation of mitigating evidence re-
garding defendant's mental state at
the time of the murder. [Antwine v.
Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1364-68 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 700
(1996).]
" Confusion among defendant's coun-
sel as to whose responsibility it was to
prepare for the sentencing phase of
trial resulted in a failure to follow up
on mitigating information regarding
defendant's life history and personal
hardship, rendering their assistance
"ineffective for failure to prepare for
the sentencing phase." [Jackson v.
Herring, 42 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.
1995).]
" The net effect of evidence suppressed
by the prosecution raised a reason-
able probability that disclosure would
have produced a different outcome.
[Kylesv. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1560
(1995).]226
3. The ABA Policy: The Task Force Report
The ABA's policy concerning federal
habeas corpus review of death penalty
cases is embodied in a comprehensive
set of sixteen recommendations, per-
haps best described as a "carefully crafted
package of interconnected reforms de-
signed as a whole to make the process
less complex and to preserve fairness."
227
These recommendations, which were ap-
proved by the ABA House of Delegates
in February 1990, are appended to this
Report as an Appendix.
In 1988, the ABA's Criminal Justice
Section formed a ten-member Task Force
to study judicial review of capital cases
that resulted in death sentences. 228 The
Task Force members included state and
federal judges, a deputy attorney gen-
eral, capital trial and post-conviction
counsel, a court administrator, and sev-
eral law professors. This broad base of
expertise facilitated full consideration of









the issue at all,




the diverse perspectives on habeas cor-
pus review of death penalty cases.229 The
Task Force presupposed the continued
existence of both capital punishment
and federal court review of capital
cases.
230
In its Background Report, released in
August 1990, the Task Force described
its mission as follows:
[Tio formulate a series of comprehen-
sive recommendations that, when imple-
mented, would produce state and fed-
eral review procedures in death penalty
cases that: are coordinated; are efficient
(in terms of the use of the time and
resources of both counsel and the
courts); result in certainty, to the extent
possible, that no person will be ex-
ecuted on the basis of a conviction that
is flawed by fundamental factual, legal,
or constitutional procedural error; and
are devoid of the chaotic character of
current "last minute," piecemeal, state
and federal reviews. 23'
The Task Force aggressively sought
input from all segments of the criminal
justice system and held six days of re-
gional, public hearings in Dallas, San
Francisco and Atlanta. 232 More than
eighty witnesses, reflecting a rich sample
of criminal justice experts, testified at
these hearings. These witnesses included
a U.S. senator, the Governor of Califor-
nia, state legislators, federal trial and
appellate judges, state supreme court
judges and justices, state attorneys gen-
eral, state and federal public defenders,
directors of death penalty resource cen-
ters, volunteer post-conviction counsel,
representatives of victims' rights organi-
zations, academics, and others. 233
Following extensive hearings and
meetings, the Task Force promulgated a
carefully crafted set of sixteen recom-
mendations. 234 Perhaps most crucial to
fairness and efficiency in capital cases,
Recommendations One through Six re-
quire "the provision of competent coun-
sel to assure that the streamlined process
is capable of fairly rectifying constitu-
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tional errors." 235 The Task Force con-
cluded that:
[C]apital litigation in the United States
today too often begins with poor legal
representation. Thereafter, the peti-
tioner, the state, and society pay the
price as each successive stage of the
case becomes more complicated, more
protracted, and more costly. Poor repre-
sentation after the trial is also not uncom-
mon, and it, too, imposes costs-in terms
of both efficiency and fairness-at each
successive stage of the litigation. The
goals of better, more efficient, and more
orderly justice can be achieved when
the quality of legal representation at all
stages of capital cases is improved. 23 6
The Task Force considered the provi-
sion of competent counsel to be the
"keystone of the American Bar Associa-
tion's recommendations."237 Although
the Task Force focused mainly on poor
trial counsel, it also recommended that
competent counsel be provided "at all
stages of capital cases."
The recommended standards for
counsel in capital cases, ultimately
adopted by the ABA, are actually far
more stringent than those proposed by
the Task Force. Nonetheless, the ABA's
recommended standards have largely
been ignored.
The Task Force also addressed three
other critical deficiencies in the legal
processes employed in capital cases. First,
the Task Force received testimony from
prosecutors and defense attorneys alike
about the "frenzied and scrambled litiga-
tion that occurs after an execution date
has been set." 238 There was broad agree-
rment that valuable resources were squan-
dered needlessly in litigating artificial
execution dates, designed merely to
move the cases along. The Task Force
recommended that a death row inmate
should be entitled to a stay of execution
in order to pursue one round of post-
conviction litigation in state and federal
court.
2 3 9
Second, the Task Force Report exam-
ined the doctrine of procedural default
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in capital cases. The federal courts and
most state courts have contemporane-
ous objection rules or other rules that
preclude a court from considering a
legal issue that was not properly raised at
trial or on appeal.2 40 Consequently, many
meritorious legal issues go unaddressed
in capital cases because of the failure of
counsel to raise the issue at all, or in a
timely fashion, or in the proper man-
ner.241 As a result, often capital defen-
dants are put to death without any exami-
nation of serious constitutional defects
in either the guilt or sentencing phase.
To avoid manifest injustice of this sort,
the Task Force recommended that fed-
eral courts be required to consider is-
sues that were not properly raised in
state court if the reason for the prison-
er's default was the ignorance or neglect
of his attorney.242
Finally, the Task Force canvassed the
law regarding second or successive ha-
beas petitions. 243 On this point, the Task
Force recommended that a prisoner
should be permitted to file a successive
habeas petition, providing the prisoner
raises a new claim that undermines con-
fidence in his or her guilt.2
44
These three critical recommendations
have met the same fate as the Task
Force's recommendations regarding
counsel: none have been adopted. To
the contrary, rather than embrace these
recommendations, the Supreme Court
has only made things worse for habeas
petitioners. Presently, death row prison-
ers are not automatically entitled to even
a single stay of execution to permit them
to pursue post-conviction remedies. Fed-
eral courts are prohibited from consider-
ing claims not properly raised in state
court, even if counsel's ignorance or
neglect will mean the execution of an
inmate with serious constitutional de-
fects in his trial or sentencing hearing.
And even prisoners who are able to
produce colorable evidence of actual
innocence are prohibited from filing
more than one habeas petition. 245 In-
deed, since the Task Force Report was
published, the standards for successor
petitions have been dramatically altered
to extinguish the right of prisoners to
file a second petition seeking judicial
consideration of their claims, 246 the
Court has fashioned a new and more
difficult rule for harmless error in ha-
beas cases,247 and it has become far more
difficult for a death row prisoner to get
an evidentiary hearing in federal
court.
248
4. Teague v. Lane249
In October 1989, the ABA Task Force
issued its recommendations and final
report. That same year, the Supreme
Court decided Teague v. Lane,250 and
sharply curtailed the availability of ha-
beas corpus relief to death row inmates
whose convictions or sentences or both
were infected with serious constitutional
errors.251 According to the Teague doc-
trine, subject to two extremely narrow
exceptions, a "new rule" of law may not
become the basis for federal habeas
relief.25 2 The Court defined "new rule"
broadly to mean one that "was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became fi-
nal. ' ' 25 For purposes of Teague, a defen-
dant's conviction becomes final after all
direct appeals are exhausted and when
either the time for filing a petition for
certiorari on direct review has lapsed, or
the Supreme Court has denied a peti-
tion for certiorari on direct review. It has
been noted that this standard "invites
federal courts to find that virtually any
holding in a case decided after a peti-
tioner has exhausted his direct appeals is
a 'new rule' that cannot be applied
retroactively." 254
The ABA has formally opposed the
Teague nonretroactivity principle and, in
testimony before both Houses of Con-
gress, ABA representatives have urged
that Teague be legislatively overruled. 255
Nonetheless, Congress has failed to fol-
low the ABA's strong recommendation,
and Teague remains a formidable barrier
to habeas relief in capital cases.
















5. Herrera v. Collins256
The Supreme Court has so drastically
curtailed access to federal habeas corpus
relief that federal courts are significantly
restricted from sparing from execution
prisoners who produce evidence of their
innocence. In Herrera v. Collins,257 the
Court held that a capital prisoner's claim
of actual innocence did not entitle him
to federal habeas relief.258 According to
the majority, "[c]laims of actual inno-
cence based on newly discovered evi-
dence have never been held to state a
ground for federal habeas relief absent
an independent constitutional violation
occurring in the underlying state crimi-
nal proceeding. '" 25
9
Justice Blackmun had this to say about
the Herrera case:
The Court's refusal [in 1993] to afford
Leonel Torres Herrera an evidentiary
hearing, despite his colorable showing
of actual innocence, demonstrates just
how far afield the Court has strayed
from its statutorily and constitutionally
imposed obligations. In Herrera, only a
bare majority of this Court could bring
itself to state forthrightly that the execu-
tion of an actually innocent person
violates the Eighth Amendment. This
concession was made only in the course
of erecting nearly insurmountable bar-
riers to a defendant's ability to get a
hearing on a claim of actual innocence.
Certainly there will be individuals who
are actually innocent who will be un-
able to make a better showing than
what was made by Herrera without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The
Court is unmoved by this dilemma,
however; it prefers "finality" in death
sentences to reliable determinations of
a capital defendant's guilt. Because I no
longer can state with any confidence
that this Court is able to reconcile the
Eighth Amendment's competing consti-
tutional commands, or that the federal
judiciary will provide meaningful over-
sight to the state courts as they exercise
their authority to inflict the penalty of
death, I believe that the death penalty,
as currently administered, is unconstitu-
tional. 260
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6. Innocence and the Death Penalty
There is "a quietly acknowledged dan-
ger in the American judicial system: the
virtual certainty of sometimes executing
innocent people. "261 Recently passed ha-
beas reform legislation imposes rigid
time limits on the ability of death-
sentenced inmates to seek review of
constitutional claims.262 Without suffi-
cient time for review, more innocent
persons will undoubtedly die.
The probability of convicting, sentenc-
ing to death, and actually executing
innocent people is substantially increased
by the draconian rules that govern proce-
dural default and abuse of the writ.2 63
Moreover, claims of innocence based on
newly discovered evidence do not, by
themselves, state a ground for federal
habeas relief.26
4
Notwithstanding procedural and sub-
stantive safeguards designed to protect
against mistakes, human error is inevi-
table. And in capital cases, human error
can be fatal. As Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall observed, "No matter how careful
courts are, the possibility of perjured
testimony, mistaken honest testimony
and human error remain all too real. We
have no way of judging how many inno-
cent persons have been executed, but we
can be certain that there were some." 265
According to a study published in
1987, more than 350 people in this
century have been erroneously con-
victed in the United States of crimes
potentially punishable by death. Of these,
116 were sentenced to death and twenty-
three were actually executed. 266 A 1993
Staff Report issued by the House Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights identified forty-eight
people who were released from prison
since 1973 after serving time on death
row.
2 6 7 Noting that four former death
row inmates were released during the
first half of 1993 after their innocence
became apparent, the Report concluded,
"there is a real danger of innocent
people being executed in the United
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States." 26 8 As the Supreme Court has
warned,
To identify before the fact those charac-
teristics of criminal homicides which
call for the death penalty, and to ex-
press these characteristics in language
which can fairly be understood and
applied by the sentencing authority,
appear to be tasks which are beyond
present human ability.2 69
7. Recent Examples of Innocent People
Released from Death Row
At least four former death row in-
mates from three different states won
freedom in 1995 after establishing their
innocence. Rolando Cruz was twice tried
and sentenced to die for the 1983 abduc-
tion, rape, and killing of a ten-year-old
girl in Illinois. Following a third trial, a
judge ordered Cruz's acquittal on No-
vember 3, 1995. At the last trial, two
officers again testified that Cruz had
described to them a vision Cruz had in
which he killed the girl. The prosecu-
tor's case fell apart when the officers'
supervisor admitted that he had lied
when he testified that the officers had
told him of Cruz's vision. 270
On December 8, 1995, prosecutors
dropped charges against Cruz's codefen-
dant, Alejandro Hernandez, who had
also been sentenced to die for the mur-
der. Hernandez spent more than a de-
cade in prison, including several years
on death row. 2 7
1
An Arizona death row inmate, Robert
Charles Cruz, walked off of death row
when he was acquitted at his fifth trial
for the 1980 contract killing of a print-
shop owner and his mother-in-law.272
Cruz, who spent more than fourteen
years in prison, won acquittal in June
1995.273
That same year, Oklahoma death row
inmate Adolph Munson was acquitted
following a retrial for the murder of a
convenience store clerk.274 The Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals granted
Munson a retrial after finding that the
state had deliberately withheld a moun-
tain of exculpatory evidence during the
original trial in 1985.275 On April 5,
1995, the jury found Munson not guilty
after deliberating a mere three hours.
Munson had spent nearly ten years await-
ing lethal injection. 276
In another Illinois case, Joseph Bur-
rows spent nearly six years awaiting ex-
ecution for the farmhouse murder of an
eighty-eight-year-old man. 277 Burrows was
released on his own recognizance in
September 1994 after the principal wit-
nesses against him recanted their testi-
mony and one confessed to the crime. 278
During the first six months of 1993,
four death row inmates from four differ-
ent states were freed after establishing
their innocence of the crimes for which
they were condemned to die. 279 In Mary-
land, Kirk Bloodsworth was sentenced to
die for the rape and murder of a young
girl. After serving two years on death
row, Bloodsworth was granted a new trial
and received a life sentence. Blood-
sworth spent nine years in prison before
DNA testing confirmed his innocence
and he was released. 28
0
In Texas, Federico Martinez-Macias
left death row after the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
upheld the award of habeas corpus relief
on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 28 1 Assisted by effective law-
yers for the first time, Macias was set free
on June 23, 1993 after a grand jury
refused to reindict him for the 1984
murders.282 Before his release, Macias
spent nearly nine years on death row.
In Alabama, Walter McMillian was
freed after three witnesses recanted their
testimony and prosecutors admitted that
they had withheld evidence favorable to
the defense. 283 It took only two days for
McMillian-a black man-to be tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death for
the 1986 murder of a white female clerk
at a dry cleaning store. 284 Before his
release on March 2, 1993, McMillian
spent six years awaiting execution. Even
before his trial began, McMillian was
imprisoned on Alabama's death row.285










































Finally, in Oklahoma, Greg Wilhoit,
who had been convicted of the 1987
murder of his estranged wife, was acquit-
ted during a March 1993 retrial. 28 6 At
Wilhoit's trial, eleven forensic experts
testified that a bite mark found on
Wilhoit's dead wife did not belong to
him. 287
These examples of persons wrongfully
condemned and belatedly exonerated
do not prove-as some suggest-that
the system works. As Justice Blackmun
observed, "[t]he problem is that the
inevitability of factual, legal and moral
error gives us a system that we know
must wrongly kill some defendants, a
system that fails to deliver the fair, consis-
tent, and reliable sentences of death
required by the Constitution." 288 More-
over, "[i] nnocent persons have been ex-
ecuted, perhaps recently, and will con-
tinue to be executed under our death
penalty scheme." 289
8. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996
Notwithstanding the steady and pre-
cipitous decline of due process protec-
tions in capital cases over the past several
decades, Congress recently attempted to
eviscerate the Great Writ. In a rush to
respond to the important issue of terror-
ism, Congress fashioned legislation in-
tended in large part to expedite the
review process in capital cases. In doing
so, Congress ignored the well-consid-
ered recommendations that emerged
from the ABA Task Force's intensive
study of much-needed habeas reform.
Congress' efforts culminated on April
26, 1996. On that day, barely a year after
the Oklahoma City bombing, President
Clinton signed into effect the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, thus changing the face of
federal habeas corpus in this country.290
The Anti-Terrorism Act brings signifi-
cant and dramatic changes to federal
habeas review while endangering the
freedoms of all Americans.291
The Anti-Terrorism Act represents a
political response to the complicated
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issues of terrorism and crime and re-
flects the contradictions and struggles of
the fierce political battle over federal
habeas that has been waged in Congress
for the past forty years.292 The Act is
poorly drafted 293 and will add confusion
and uncertainty in cases pending before
federal courts on habeas review. More-
over, portions of the statute appear to
overrule, undermine or contradict exist-
ing case law,294 including such key cases
as Rose v. Lundy,295 Townsend v. Sam,2 96
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,297 McCleskey v.
Zant,298 Schlup v. Delo,299 Granberry v.
Greer,300 and Teague v. Lane.30 1 Undoubt-
edly, the newly minted Anti-Terrorism
Act will demand a substantial amount of
time and resources to clarify and un-
ravel. 302
The long-term effects of the Anti-
Terrorism Act and the changes it will
impose on capital litigation are un-
known. Nonetheless, it appears evident
that the new legislation will undermine a
defendant's ability not only to litigate
valid constitutional issues but also to
raise claims of actual innocence. The key
features of the new law include:
(1) restricting the ability of federal
courts to entertain a successive ha-
beas corpus petition and requiring
any prisoner seeking to file a succes-
sive habeas petition to first obtain
permission from a panel of the
court of appeals;
(2) imposing a statute of limitations
for filing habeas petitions;
(3) amending the requirements for ex-
hausting state remedies;
(4) altering the rules governing eviden-
tiary hearings;
(5) changing the standard of review
for any issue or claim "adjudicated
on the merits" in state court pro-
ceedings;
(6) restricting the ability of a prisoner
to appeal to the federal court of
appeals by replacing the "certifi-
cate of probable cause" with the
"certificate of appealability"; and
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(7) adding to Title 28 of the United
States Code a new chapter setting
forth "Special Habeas Corpus Pro-
cedures in Capital Cases. 30 3
Among the critical changes worked by
the Anti-Terrorism Act is the effect that
federal courts must acquiesce to state
court decisions regarding federal consti-
tutional claims. 30 4 In a sharp departure
from previous federal habeas law,30 5 Sec-
tion 2254(d) now provides:
An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
Under this provision, even if a federal
court concludes that a state court is
wrong as a matter of law and that a
defendant's federal constitutional rights
were violated, the federal court would be
barred from granting relief. Rather, be-
fore relief may be granted, the federal
court must determine whether the state
court's erroneous application of the law
was "unreasonable." Thus, not only must
the state court be wrong, it must be
unreasonably wrong before a federal
court may grant relief to the aggrieved
defendant.30 6
In addition, the statute places new
burdens on the ability of federal courts
to review factual findings. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), "a determination
of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct. The
applicant shall have the burden of rebut-
ting the presumption of correctness by
clear and convincing evidence." The Act
also severely circumscribes the availabil-
ity of evidentiary hearings in federal
habeas to develop and review factual
questions. Section 2254(e) (2) now pro-
vides:
If the applicant has failed to develop
the factual basis of a claim in State
court proceedings, the court shall not
hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless the applicant shows that-
(A) the claim relies on-
(i) a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Su-
preme Court, that was previ-
ously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could
not have been previously dis-
covered through the exercise
of due diligence; and
(B) the fact underlying the claim
would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evi-
dence that but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.
This provision significantly changes the
availability and role of evidentiary hear-
ings in federal habeas proceedings.
"Read literally [the new statute] elimi-
nates any federal standards for the fact-
finding process in state court and thus
ostensibly establishes a presumption in
favor of a state finding of fact, without
regard for the process from which it
generated. ' 30 7 "In effect, only prisoners
who can make a persuasive showing of
factual innocence can obtain a federal
evidentiary hearing into facts that may
support a constitutional claim." 30 8 Seri-
ous due process problems are raised by
such a system of review,30 9 and these
substantive changes run counter to the
merits of constitutional claims.
Other provisions of the Anti-Terror-
ism Act focus on procedural changes










and impose strict time lines and limita-
tions on appellate review. These changes
profoundly affect the ability of capital
defendants to present legitimate, consti-
tutional claims and undermine the faith
one can place in the federal oversight of
capital cases. Further, these procedural
changes must be considered in light of
the ever-increasing crisis of attorney avail-
ability and defunding of resource cen-
ters, and whether it is realistic or even
possible for defendants to comply with
the deadlines. The Anti-Terrorism Act
dramatically changes federal habeas re-
view and the independence of the fed-
eral judiciary. Not only do the changes
brought about by the Anti-Terrorism Act
raise grave concerns about the future
ability of federal courts to assure that the
death penalty is carried out in accor-
dance with due process and the Constitu-
tion, but also the new legislation marks a
dangerous path endangering the free-
dom of all Americans.
D. Discrimination on the Basis of the Race
of the Victim and the Race of the Defendant
Still Infects a Very Large Number
of Capital Cases
1. The ABA Policy
The ABA is clearly and firmly on
record as opposing discrimination in
capital sentencing.3 10 In August 1988,
the ABA adopted the following policy:
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar
Association opposes discrimination in
capital sentencing on the basis of the
race of either the victim or the defen-
dant.
Be It Further Resolved, that the Ameri-
can Bar Association supports the enact-
ment of federal and state legislation
which strives to eliminate any racial
discrimination in capital sentencing
which may exist.311
2. Legal Defense Fund Statistics
That race continues to play a major
role in determining who shall live and
who shall die is confirmed by an exami-
nation of the racial composition of death
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rows throughout the country and the
defendant-victim racial combinations in
offenses that have resulted in death sen-
tences. Currently, although blacks com-
prise roughly twelve to thirteen percent
of our country's population, more than
forty percent of America's death row
population is black. 12 When other mem-
bers of minority groups are included,
more than half of America's death row
population consists of people of color.313
Of those defendants executed since the
1976 reinstatement of capital punish-
ment, nearly thirty-nine percent were
black.
Defendant-victim racial combinations
likewise illustrate that the longstanding
patterns of racial discrimination "that
were pursued down one hole with proce-
dural rules and verbal formulas have
come to the surface somewhere else,just
as virulent and pernicious as they were
in their original form." 314 Fully eighty-
three percent of persons condemned to
die were convicted of murdering white
victims.3 15 By contrast, only twelve per-
cent of persons condemned to die were
convicted of murdering black victims.3 16
3. Prosecutorial Discretion
Federal prosecutorial power derives
from Article II, Section 3 of the United
States Constitution, which provides that
the executive branch "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Most state constitutions contain similar
provisions.
Prosecutors enjoy broad discretion in
making critical decisions. Perhaps most
important is the charging decision: "the
determination whether a particular per-
son should formally be accused of a
crime and, if so, on precisely what charge
or charges." 317 These decisions are un-
likely to be disturbed. As the Supreme
Court stated in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,3 18
[S]o long as the prosecutor has prob-
able cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by stat-
ute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or
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bring before a grand jury, generally
rests entirely in his discretion.
Nonetheless, prosecutorial discretion
is not wholly unfettered. In certain situa-
tions, the Constitution itself may con-
strain a prosecutor's power. For ex-
ample, discriminatory prosecutions are
prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause,3 19 and vindictive prosecutions
may violate the Due Process Clause.
320
According to Richard Burr, former
director of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.'s Capital
Punishment Project, racial bias often
plays a role in the exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion.
The first issue is that racial bias has very
frequently influenced the prosecutor's
judgment to seek death and the ability
to obtain it. Racial bias works in a
couple of ways; it creates an inflated
concern for the value of white people's
lives who are victims of murder and a
corresponding lack of concern for the
lives of black people who are the victims
of murder. The white victim [of] mur-
der is invariably the more politically
popular murder to prosecute in any
jurisdiction in this country.
Additionally, racial bias impacts the sen-
tencing process by influencing the pros-
ecutor's evaluation of a crime, apart
from the race of the victim. There are
still many racist assumptions that work
against black defendants. Unfounded
presumptions about violent behavior
and tendencies.., can lead to a skewed
view of whether someone is guilty or
whether they have been so closely re-
lated to a horrendous murder that
death is the appropriate punishment. If
one takes a cross-section of death row
cases, race issues will have permeated at
least three-fourths of that cross-section
in some way or another. This will be
true whether the defendant is white or
black, but particularly if the defendant
is black.321
Justice Thurgood Marshall's Furman
opinion was characteristically more
blunt.
Regarding discrimination, it has been
said that "[i]t is usually the poor, the
illiterate, the underprivileged, the mem-
ber of the minority group-the man
who, because he is without means, and
is defended by a court-appointed attor-
ney-who becomes society's sacrificial
lamb .. " Indeed, a look at the bare
statistics regarding executions is enough
to betray much of the discrimination. A
total of 3,859 persons have been ex-
ecuted since 1930, of whom 1,751 were
white and 2,066 were Negro. Of the
executions, 3,334 were for murder;
1,664 of the executed murderers were
white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 per-
sons, including 48 whites and 405 Ne-
groes, were executed for rape. It is
immediately apparent that Negroes
were executed far more often than
whites in proportion to their percent-
age of the population. Studies indicate
that while the higher rate of execution
among Negroes is partially due to a
higher rate of crime, there is evidence
of racial discrimination .... In Mc-
Gautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 207, this
Court held "that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the
power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is [not] offensive to any-
thing in the Constitution." This was an
open invitation to discrimination. 32
As discussed below,32 3 the ABA strongly
supported the Racial Justice Act, a mea-
sure designed to rectify some of these
problems.
4. The Baldus Study
Numerous studies on the imposition
of capital punishment under current
statutes reveal racial discrimination based
on the race of the victim and, to a lesser
extent, the race of the defendant. 324
Perhaps the best known of these studies
was conducted by University of Iowa Law
Professor David Baldus. Using a staff of
law students and relying primarily on
official Georgia state records, Baldus
examined all homicides committed in
Georgia between 1973 and 1979. Using
this pool of more than 2000 murders,
Baldus identified and coded 230 non-
racial variables.
325










based on the race
of the victim
and, to a lesser
extent, the race
of the defendant.
With meticulous care, 26 Baldus ana-
lyzed and then re-analyzed the vast infor-
mation his team collected on Georgia
homicides in search of any explanation-
other than race-that might account for
the stark inequalities in the operation of
Georgia's capital sentencing system. He
found none.3 27
Baldus' data indicated that defen-
dants charged with killing white persons
received the death penalty in eleven
percent of the cases, but defendants
charged with killing blacks received the
death penalty in only one percent of the
cases.3 28 The Baldus study also divided
the cases according to the combination
of the race of the defendant and the race
of the victim. The study found that the
death penalty was assessed in twenty-two
percent of the cases involving black de-
fendants and white victims; eight per-
cent of the cases involving white defen-
dants and white victims; one percent of
the cases involving black defendants and
black victims; and three percent of the
cases involving white defendants and
black victims. 329
According to the study, prosecutors
sought the death penalty in seventy per-
cent of the cases involving black defen-
dants and white victims; thirty-two per-
cent of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims; fifteen
percent of the cases involving black de-
fendants and black victims; and nine-
teen percent of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims. 330
The disturbing conclusion of the Bal-
dus study-that in Georgia, a killer of a
white person was 4.3 times more likely to
be sentenced to death than someone
who killed a black person-is consistent
with statistics from many other jurisdic-
tions throughout the country. For ex-
ample, in Louisiana, defendants in white
victim cases are twice as likely to be
sentenced to death than are defendants
in black victim cases. In Florida, defen-
dants in white victim cases are 3.4 times
more likely to be sentenced to death
than are defendants in black victim cases.
The multiplier in Arkansas is 3.5; in
Illinois, 4; in Oklahoma, 4.3; in North
Carolina, 4.4; in Mississippi, 5. Finally, in
Maryland, defendants in white victim
cases are 7.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than are defendants
in black victim cases. 331
5. McCleskey v. Kemp 3 2
Warren McCleskey, a black man sen-
tenced to death for killing a white police
officer in Georgia,333 urged the Court to
find that the Baldus study demonstrated
that Georgia's capital sentencing proce-
dures discriminated on the basis of race
in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. In a five-to-four
decision, the Court refused.
McCleskey argued that the Baldus
study's conclusion that killers of white
victims are 4.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than killers of black
victims proved discrimination on the
basis of race, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. In addition, the Bal-
dus study showed that blacks who kill
whites were sentenced to death "at nearly
22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks,
and more than 7 times the rate of whites
who kill blacks."' S4 Although the Court
"acknowledge [d] that McCleskey ha[d]
demonstrated a risk that racial prejudice
plays a role in capital sentencing in
Georgia,"33 5 it nonetheless denied re-
lief. Fatal to McCleskey's equal protec-
tion claim, according to the bare major-
ity, was McCleskey's failure to prove that
either the Georgia legislature or a deci-
sionmaker in his case acted with a discrim-
inatory purpose.3 36
McCleskey's Eighth Amendment argu-
ment that his death sentence was arbi-
trary and capricious, and therefore exces-
sive, because racial considerations
influenced capital sentencing decisions
in Georgia was likewise rejected. 337 Ac-
cording to the Court, "[a]t most the
Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that
appears to correlate with race. Apparent
disparities in sentencing are an inevi-
table part of our criminal justice sys-
tem." 3 8 Thus, although the Baldus study
identified a serious risk that racial preju-
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dice influences capital sentencing, the
risk was not "constitutionally unaccept-
able." 339 In denying relief, Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the five-member majority,
observed that McCleskey's arguments
"are best presented to the legislative
bodies. "340
6. Justice Powell's Change of Heart
The fragile distinction between life
and death decisionmaking in Warren
McCleskey's case became apparent years
later. Justice Lewis Powell, the author of
the five to four majority opinion that
sealed McCleskey's fate, retired within
months of the decision. Four years later,
in the summer of 1991, Powell was asked
whether he would change his vote in any
case. According to Powell's biographer,
the retired justice responded, "Yes,
McCleskey v. Kemp."' 341 Powell had come
to believe that capital punishment should
be abolished.34 2 No doubt this change of
heart would have provided cold comfort
to Warren McCleskey, who died in Geor-
gia's electric chair on September 25,
1991.343
7. The 1990 General Accounting
Office Study
A 1990 report by the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) reviewed twenty-eight
different empirical studies that exam-
ined the effects of race in capital cases.344
The GAO Report concluded that these
studies clearly documented a pattern
"indicating racial disparities in the charg-
ing, sentencing and imposition of the
death penalty. ' 345 Of the twenty-eight
empirical studies reviewed by GAO,
eighty-two percent concluded that the
"race of [the] victim ... influence[d]
the likelihood of being charged with
capital murder or receiving the death
penalty." 346
In an ABA-sponsored program, 347 Paul
Kamenar, Executive Legal Director for
the Washington Legal Foundation, a
conservative public interest group, at-
tacked the methodology and conclu-
sions of the Baldus study. Kamenar ex-
plained his group's position:
Our position is that there is really no
convincing evidence-you just heard
some anecdotal evidence-of racial bias
in the criminaljustice system in general
and the death penalty in particular.348
Kamenar took particular issue with the
use of the Baldus study in the McCleskey
case. 349 Kamenar complained,
[I] n the McCleskey case, McCleskey mur-
dered a white person, and the fact of
the matter was that the person hap-
pened to be a police officer, and 85% of
the police that are murdered are white.
Therefore, there are other factors counted
in there. So, again, itjust seems difficult
even to try to make some sense out of
that.350
Kamenar's criticism of the Baldus study
reveals a profoundly disturbing lack of
familiarity with the methodology used by
Baldus' team. The strength of the Baldus
study derives in substantial part from the
fact that the study took into account 230
nonracial variables, including the very
factors that Kamenar suggested were not
considered. 351 Indeed, after performing
its own re-analysis of the methodology
used, the GAO found the Baldus study
"to be quite robust in terms of its find-
ings." 352
8. Donald "Pee Wee" Gaskins, Kermit Smith,
Thomas Grasso, and Robert O'Neal
Executions resumed almost immedi-
ately following the 1976 Gregg decision.
Gary Gilmore, a white man convicted of
murdering a white victim, waived all
appeals and died before Utah's firing
squad on January 17, 1977. The next
inmate executed wasJohn Spenkelink, a
white man convicted of murdering an-
other white man. Spenkelink died in
Florida's electric chair on May 25, 1979.
However, not until late 1991, fourteen
years after executions resumed, was a
white inmate actually executed for the
murder of a black victim. After an unsuc-
cessful suicide attempt, Donald "Pee
Wee" Gaskins, a white death row inmate

















in South Carolina, was electrocuted on
September 6, 1991 for the murder of a
fellow black inmate.
Prior to Gaskins, the last white person
put to death in this country for killing a
black person died in Kansas in 1944.
South Carolina had not executed a white
person convicted of killing a black per-
son since 1880.
Since Gaskin's electrocution, only
three other white death row inmates
have been put to death for the murder
of a black person. Kermit Smith died by
lethal injection in North Carolina on
January 24, 1995.353 Thomas Grasso, who
waived all appeals and sought death, was
killed by lethal injection in Oklahoma
on March 20, 1995.354 Finally, Robert
O'Neal of Missouri's death row died by
lethal injection on December 6, 1995.355
9. The RacialJustice Act
Despite strong statistical evidence of
racial discrimination in capital cases, the
Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp
denied relief, in part because the prob-
lems of racism in capital cases "are best
presented to the legislative bodies." 356
Since McCleskey, the ABA has consistently
supported legislation directed towards
eradicating racism in capital cases. All
proposed bills that address the problems
identified in McCleskey have failed to
become law.35
7
Congress came closest to remedying
the situation in 1994. That year, the
House of Representatives passed the Ra-
cial Justice Act as part of the omnibus
crime bill. 58 The Racial Justice Act en-
joyed the strong support of the ABA.
Under the Racial Justice Act, proof of
significant racial discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty
would have required the prosecutor to
demonstrate a non-race-based explana-
tion for the resulting death sentence. 359
Although the measure passed the House,
Senate Republicans threatened to filibus-
ter if the omnibus crime bill included
the Racial Justice Act. In July 1994, the
White House withdrew support for the
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty
Features
RacialJustice Act and it was deleted from
the crime bill.
Contrary to assertions by its oppo-
nents, the Racial Justice Act would not
have abolished the death penalty or
prevented its imposition.160 Rather, the
Act provided that no person shall be put
to death under federal or state law if the
sentence was imposed because of the
race of the defendant or the race of the
victim. A defendant challenging a death
sentence under the Act would be re-
quired to prove a pattern of racially
discriminatory death sentences in the
particular jurisdiction in which he was
tried and sentenced to die. Merely show-
ing that blacks are sentenced to death
more frequently than whites for the
same type of offense would not entitle a
defendant to relief. Instead the defen-
dant would have to show bias in the
particular sentence being challenged. 61
10. Justice Harry Blackmun's Views
on Racism in Capital Cases
Racism as an ineradicable feature of
capital punishment prompted Justice
Harry Blackmun-after thirty-five years
of deciding capital cases-to conclude
that the death penalty was in all cases
unconstitutional. 362 Justice Blackmun
squarely and thoroughly addressed the
issue of race in his dissent in Callins v.
Collins.363
The arbitrariness inherent in the sen-
tencer's discretion to afford mercy is
exacerbated by the problem of race.
Even under the most sophisticated
death penalty statutes, race continues
to play a major role in determining who
shall live and who shall die. Perhaps it
should not be surprising that the biases
and prejudices that infect society gener-
ally would influence the determination
of who is sentenced to death, even
within the narrower pool of death-
eligible defendants selected according
to objective standards. No matter how
narrowly the pool of death-eligible de-
fendants is drawn according to objec-
tive standards, Furman's promise still
will go unfulfilled so long as the sen-
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tencer is free to exercise unbridled
discretion within the smaller group and
thereby to discriminate. "The power to
be lenient [also] is the power to dis-
criminate." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
at 312, quoting K. Davis, Discretionary
Justice 170 (1973).
A renowned example of racism infect-
ing a capital-sentencing scheme is docu-
mented in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987). Warren McCleskey, an Afri-
can-American, argued that the Georgia
capital-sentencing scheme was adminis-
tered in a racially discriminatory man-
ner, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In support
of his claim, he proffered a highly
reliable statistical study (the Baldus
study) which indicated that, "after tak-
ing into account some 230 nonracial
factors that might legitimately influ-
ence a sentencer, the jury more likely
than not would have spared McCleskey's
life had his victim been black." 481 U.S.
at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Baldus study further demonstrated that
blacks who kill whites are sentenced to
death "at nearly 22 times the rate of
blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7
times the rate of whites who kill blacks."
Id. at 327.
Despite this staggering evidence of ra-
cial prejudice infecting Georgia's capi-
tal-sentencing scheme, the majority
turned its back on McCleskey's claims,
apparently troubled by the fact that
Georgia had instituted more proce-
dural and substantive safeguards than
most other States since Furman, but was
still unable to stamp out the virus of
racism. Faced with the apparent failure
of traditional legal devices to cure the
evils identified in Furman, the majority
wondered aloud whether the consis-
tency and rationality demanded by the
dissent could ever be achieved without
sacrificing the discretion which is essen-
tial to fair treatment of individual defen-
dants:
"[I]t is difficult to imagine guidelines
that would produce the predictability
sought by the dissent without sacrific-
ing the discretion essential to a hu-
mane and fair system of criminal justice
.... The dissent repeatedly emphasizes
the need for 'a uniquely high degree of
rationality in imposing the death pen-
alty' ... . Again, no suggestion is made
as to how greater 'rationality' could be
achieved under any type of statute that
authorizes capital punishment ....
Given these safeguards already inher-
ent in the imposition and review of
capital sentences, the dissent's call for
greater rationality is no less than a
claim that a capital punishment system
cannot be administered in accord with
the Constitution." Id. at 314-315 n.37.
The fact that we may not be capable of
devising procedural or substantive rules
to prevent the more subtle and often
unconscious forms of racism from
creeping into the system does not jus-
tify the wholesale abandonment of the
Furman promise. To the contrary, where
a morally irrelevant-indeed, a repug-
nant - consideration plays a major
role in the determination of who shall
live and who shall die, it suggests that
the continued enforcement of the death
penalty in light of its clear and admitted
defects is deserving of a "sober second
thought." Justice Brennan explained:
"Those whom we would banish from
society or from the human community
itself often speak in too faint a voice to
be heard above society's demand for
punishment. It is the particular role of
courts to hear these voices, for the
Constitution declares that the majoritar-
ian chorus may not alone dictate the
conditions of social life. The Court thus
fulfills, rather than disrupts, the scheme
of separation of powers by closely scruti-
nizing the imposition of the death pen-
alty, for no decision of a society is more
deserving of the 'sober second thought.'
Stone, The Common Law in the United
States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 25 (1936)."
Id. at 343.
In the years since McCleskey, I have
come to wonder whether there was
truth in the majority's suggestion that
discrimination and arbitrariness could
not be purged from the administration
of capital punishment without sacrific-
ing the equally essential component of






















Viewed in this way, the consistency
promised in Furman and the fairness to
the individual demanded in Lockett are
not only inversely related, but irrecon-
cilable in the context of capital punish-
ment. Any statute or procedure that
could effectively eliminate arbitrariness
from the administration of death would
also restrict the sentencer's discretion
to such an extent that the sentencer
would be unable to give full consider-
ation to the unique characteristics of
each defendant and the circumstances
of the offense. By the same token, any
statute or procedure that would pro-
vide the sentencer with sufficient discre-
tion to consider fully and act upon the
unique circumstances of each defen-
dant would "throw open the back door
to arbitrary and irrational sentencing."
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. at 912
(Thomas,J., concurring). All efforts to
strike an appropriate balance between
these conflicting constitutional com-
mands are futile because there is a
heightened need for both in the admin-
istration of death.
But even if the constitutional require-
ments of consistency and fairness are
theoretically reconcilable in the con-
text of capital punishment, it is clear
that this Court is not prepared to meet
the challenge. In apparent frustration
over its inability to strike an appropri-
ate balance between the Furman prom-
ise of consistency and the Lockett require-
ment of individualized sentencing, the
Court has retreated from the field,
allowing relevant mitigating evidence
to be discarded, vague aggravating cir-
cumstances to be employed, and provid-
ing no indication that the problem of
race in the administration of death will
ever be addressed. In fact some mem-
bers of the Court openly have acknowl-
edged a willingness simply to pick one
of the competing constitutional com-
mands and sacrifice the other.... These
developments are troubling, as they
ensure that death will continue to be
meted out in this country arbitrarily
and discriminatorily, and without that
"degree of respect due the uniqueness
of the individual." Lockett, 438 U.S. at
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605. In my view, the proper course
when faced with irreconcilable constitu-
tional commands is not to ignore one
or the other, nor to pretend that the
dilemma does not exist, but to admit
the futility of the effort to harmonize
them. This means accepting the fact
that the death penalty cannot be admin-
istered in accord with our Constitu-
tion. 36 4
E. Persons with Mental Retardation Are
Being Sentenced to Death and Executed
1. The ABA Policy
In February 1989, the ABA estab-
lished a firm policy prohibiting the ex-
ecution of persons who are "mentally
retarded" as defined by the American
Association of Mental Retardation.
365
The ABA policy provides as follows:
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar
Association urges that no person with
mental retardation, as defined by the
American Association on Mental Retar-
dation, should be sentenced to death
and executed; and
Be It Further Resolved, that the Ameri-
can Bar Association supports enact-
ment of legislation barring the execu-
tion of defendants with mental
retardation.3 66
Notwithstanding these clear pro-
nouncements of ABA policy, twenty-
eight capital jurisdictions currently per-
mit the execution of mentally retarded
persons.3 67 Recent research suggests that
between twelve and twenty percent of
the death row population in this country
consists of persons with mental retarda-
tion.3 68 And, as is true of so many other
ABA policies, the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Constitution as permit-
ting the execution of mentally retarded
offenders flies in the face of ABA policy.
2. Penry v. Lynaugh369
In Penry v. Lynaugh3 7 0-decided just
four months after the ABA adopted a
resolution prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded persons-the Supreme
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Court refused to hold that the execution
of a mentally retarded prisoner violated
the Eighth Amendment. Although sev-
eral states proscribe executing mentally
retarded persons, most do not.
Penry v. Lynaugh3 7 1 involved a chal-
lenge to Texas' death penalty statute.
While on parole from a rape conviction,
Johnny Paul Penry was charged with the
brutal rape and murder of Pamela Car-
penter.372 At trial, Penry raised an insan-
ity defense and presented the testimony
of a psychiatrist, Dr. Jose Garcia. Dr.
Garcia testified that Penry suffered from
organic brain damage and moderate
retardation. As a result, Penry had poor
control over his impulses and was unable
to learn from experience. According to
Dr. Garcia, Penry's brain damage was
probably caused at birth but may have
been caused by beatings and multiple
injuries to the brain at an early age. In
Dr. Garcia's judgment, Penry was suffer-
ing from an organic brain disorder at
the time of the offense that made it
impossible for him to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the law.373
Penry argued that under Texas law
the sentencing jury was prevented from
giving full mitigating effect to his evi-
dence of child abuse and mental retarda-
tion.3 74 Texas' sentencing statute then
required the jury, during a separate
sentencing phase, to answer three ques-
tions. The answers to these questions
would determine whether the defen-
dant would be sentenced to death.37 5
Only one of the three questions-
whether the defendant posed a "continu-
ing threat to society"-was related to
Penry's mitigating evidence. 376 But Pen-
ry's evidence of child abuse and mental
retardation was double-edged: "it may
diminish his blameworthiness for his
crime even as it indicated that there
[was] a probability that he [would] be
dangerous in the future. '377 Because a
reasonable juror could have believed
that the Texas statute prohibited a sen-
tence less than death based upon Pen-
ry's mitigating evidence, the Court re-
versed Penry's death sentence.378
AsJustice Blackmun recognized, Penry
exemplifies the "paradox underlying the
Court's post-Furman jurisprudence. '" 3 79
The Court earlier had held that Texas
had complied with Furman by carefully
channeling the sentencer's discretion.380
Indeed, Texas had channeled discretion
by requiring that a jury unanimously
answer three questions affirmatively be-
fore a defendant would be sentenced to
death.381 Yet those same limitations
placed upon the sentencer's discretion
rendered Penry's death sentence uncon-
stitutional. 382
The ABA policy against executing
mentally retarded offenders recognizes
the dual nature of evidence of retarda-
tion in a capital sentencing context.
Even though most courts and legisla-
tures consider mental disorders a mitigat-
ing factor that lessens an offender's cul-
pability,jurors are susceptible to viewing
a mental disorder solely as an aggravat-
ing factor, particularly in jurisdictions
that employ future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor. The risk, then, be-
comes that a jury will sentence a defen-
dant to die not in spite of the fact that he
is mentally retarded, but rather because
he is mentally retarded.383
3. Examples of Mentally Retarded People
Who Have Been Executed
Like children, mentally retarded adults
are easily led, susceptible to influence,
and ill-equipped to defend themselves.3 84
These characteristics were particularly
true of Barry Fairchild, a mentally re-
tarded black man condemned to die in
Arkansas for the 1983 kidnaping, rape,
and murder of Marjorie Mason, a white
nurse.385 The bulk of the evidence against
Fairchild consisted of a videotaped inter-
rogation during which Fairchild admits
to being an accomplice, but said that he
was sitting in a car when someone else-
whom he refused to identify-killed Ms.
Mason. 386 Fairchild, whose head is ban-
daged from injuries, is clearly shown on
the videotape glancing away from the

























camera towards an apparent coach as he
incriminates himself.38 7
On IQ tests administered to Fairchild
years after his trial, he scored a Full Scale
IQ of 63, a Verbal IQ of 69, and a
Performance IQ of 61.388 Nonetheless,
relying on some higher test scores that
the state's psychologist attributed to
Fairchild, the federal district courtjudge
concluded that he was not retarded. 389
Although the threshold for retardation
in Arkansas was an IQ of 70, and the
evidence in Fairchild's case "was mixed,"
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's conclusion that Fairchild was not
retarded.390 An Arkansas statute, passed
the year before Fairchild's execution,
prohibited the execution of anyone with
an IQ under 65.391 Because Fairchild was
sentenced to die before the statute was
enacted, it did not apply to him.392
Fairchild died by lethal injection on August
31, 1995 .393
Morris Mason, a black farmworker in
Virginia, was sentenced to die for the
murder of an elderly white woman.3 94
Mason's long history of mental illness
earned him commitments in three state
mental institutions.395 In addition to
paranoid schizophrenia, Mason suffered
from mental retardation. Diagnoses re-
vealed that Mason's mental age was eight,
and his IQ was 66. Although three psy-
chiatrists independently determined that
Mason suffered from paranoid schizo-
phrenia over an eight-year period prior
to his 1978 trial, the trial court denied
Mason's request for the assistance of a
psychiatrist to evaluate his sanity.39 6
After exhaustingjudicial remedies, Ma-
son's lawyers appealed to the governor
of Virginia for clemency on the grounds
of Mason's mental retardation and his-
tory of mental illness.397 The governor
refused to grant clemency, and Mason
was executed on June 25, 1985.398
When Kathryn Stryker, a fifty-five-
year-old white woman, was brutally mur-
dered in Columbus, Georgia in 1976,
police arrested sixteen-year-old James
Graves, a black juvenile.3 99 Graves gave a
statement implicating twenty-four-year-
old Jerome Bowden, a black man, and
Bowden was also arrested and charged.4"'
Graves, the juvenile, was convicted
and sentenced to life. Later, Graves was
adjudicated insane and was committed
to the Georgia state hospital for the
criminally insane.40 1 Although no physi-
cal evidence linked Bowden to the mur-
der, Bowden was convicted, largely be-
cause he signed a confession drafted for
him by the police. 40 2 Bowden was sen-
tenced to death, just fifty-six days follow-
ing his arrest.40 3
At age fourteen, Bowden scored "a
full scale IQ of 59 on the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children." Shortly
before his execution, Bowden was again
tested. This time he scored "a verbal IQ
of 71, a non-verbal IQ of 62 and a full
scale IQ of 65."' 404 Remarkably, the psy-
chological examiner suggested that
Bowden would need an IQ of 45 or less
to be spared.40 5 In one of his final
telephone calls to his attorneys, Bowden
discussed the IQ test he had taken a few
hours earlier. Bowden said, "I tried real
hard. I did the best I could." Bowden
was electrocuted on June 24, 1986.406
Perhaps because of the double-edged
nature of the potential mitigating evi-
dence in the case of Mario Marquez, his
defense counsel decided not to present
any evidence of his severe childhood
abuse, mental retardation, and brain
damage. 40 7 If such evidence had been
presented, the jury would have learned
that since Mr. Marquez's infancy, his
father had routinely "beat him merci-
lessly, using boards, sticks, and fists[,]...
whip [ping] him with a horsewhip[,] and
on several occasions [binding] Mario's
hands and legs and [hanging] him from
a pole or tree and horsewhipp[ing] him
until he was unconscious." 40 8
When he was only twelve years old,
Mario was abandoned by his parents and
left to fend for himself and, initially,
several of his younger siblings.40 9 The
siblings were later removed by county
authorities from the abandoned house
in which they lived, but for some reason,
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Mario was left there without any adult
supervision from that point forward.
41 °
Mario's childhood beatings appar-
ently resulted from his father's belief
that Mario was "slow." '411 This was, in
fact, true: Mario was mentally retarded,
apparently from the time of his birth.412
A striking example of how his retarda-
tion had an impact on Mario's ability to
think and reason occurred while he was
eating the last meal before his execu-
tion. Mario set aside his dessert choice,
apple pie, because he wanted to "save it
for later."
413
Mario also was diagnosed as having
severe brain damage, merely one of the
effects of his father's ritual beatings that
severely damaged his cerebral cortex.4 14
The combination of Mario's brain dam-
age, mental retardation, and childhood
abuse left him with the emotional and
intellectual maturity of a five year old.4 15
The difficulties of Mr. Marquez's situa-
tion were compounded during the pun-
ishment phase of his trial when, after he
was involved in a minor altercation with
local television cameramen outside the
courtroom, thejudge ordered him shack-
led for the remainder of that trial phase.
Thejury, which was responsible for assess-
ing whether Mr. Marquez would be a
danger to the community in the future,
could visibly see that even in a place as
"secure" as the courtroom, Mr. Marquez
had to have his hands cuffed behind his
back, his legs bound with leg irons, and
one leg immobilized by a clamp that
prevented knee movement. 416 Not sur-
prisingly, that same jury voted for death.
Television news personality, Ted Kop-
pel, among others, witnessed the execu-
tion of Mario Marquez on January 18,
1995.417
4. The Execution of Other Mental Defectives
Since 1986, the Supreme Court has
prohibited the execution of persons
found to be insane. 418 Nonetheless, in-
mates who suffer profound mental de-
fects that fall short of insanity are rou-
tinely executed. Here are several
examples.
a. Rickey Ray Rector
Rickey Ray Rector shot and killed a
police officer, then shot himself through
the forehead. 419 The bullet tore com-
pletely through the front of Rector's
skull and lodged under the skin above
his right ear.420 Rector underwent emer-
gency brain surgery, during which three
inches of frontal brain tissue were re-
moved from his head. Although Rector
survived, the damage to his brain was so
severe that the surgery amounted to "a
classic prefrontal lobotomy." 421 A jour-
nalist characterized Rector's post-opera-
tive mental condition as follows:
The clinical effect of such a substantial
destruction of frontal brain tissue is
that Rector, as it was presented in testi-
mony over the ensuing months, would
suffer from "gross memory loss," and
particularly that when dealing with
"content and meaning" he was "se-
verely impaired," and would have a
near-total inability to conceptualize be-
yond a response to immediate sensa-
tions or provocations; in fact, he
"seemed unable to grasp either the
concept of past or future." A state
psychologist also noted that he had
"difficulty maintaining concentration
and attention to a task." In addition,
although Rector did "demonstrate ...
some abilities to handle his day-to-day
life in terms of actions which are repeti-
tive," he also demonstrated what is
know as a flat affect, meaning that
"when it comes down to the issues of
emotion ... Rickey has absolutely no
involvement in any of the dire circum-
stances of his life." In fact, the Little
Rock clinical neuropsychologist found
him to be "lacking a will or an under-
standing of a way to fight his present
dilemma." 422
Following a pretrial competency hear-
ing, which produced expert testimony a
higher court would later characterize as
"hopelessly in conflict," Rector was
deemed fit to be tried.4 23 He stood trial
and was convicted and sentenced to
die.4
24
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In the four days prior to Rectors
execution, his every move and utterance
were assiduously recorded in a "death
watch log" kept by prison guards.425
Rector spent much of his time howling,
barking like a dog, stamping his feet,
snapping his finger, and laughing. Occa-
sionally, Rector would scream, "Cold
Duck, Cold Duck," the nickname of an
old friend.4 26 From his death watch cell,
Rector learned that Arkansas Governor
Bill Clinton-who was running for presi-
dent-refused clemency. Just hours be-
fore his execution, Rector sat with his
attorney and watched news broadcasts
detailing both Rector's imminent execu-
tion and sexual harassment charges lev-
eled at Governor Clinton by Gennifer
Flowers. Rector mumbled to his attor-
ney, "I'm gonna vote for him. Gonna
vote for Clinton." 42 7
Rector confided to a death watch
guard that "if you eat grass lethal injec-
tion won't kill you." 428 Rector devoured
all of his last meal except for dessert, a
large portion of pecan pie. As was his
habit, Rector put his dessert aside to be
eaten later-after the execution. 429 He
died by lethal injection on January 24,
1992.430
b. David Funchess
David Funchess, a black man, enlisted
in the Marines at age eighteen. 43 1 Two
years later he was sent to South Vietnam,
where he was involved in some of the
most intensive combat of the war. Funch-
ess was severely injured from a land
mine explosion and spent three months
recovering in a naval hospital in Japan.
Funchess was sentenced to die for
killing two white people during a 1974
robbery of a bar.432 Years later, Funchess
was diagnosed as suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a
psychiatric disorder now known to afflict
a significant number of Vietnam war
veterans. However, at the time of Funch-
ess' trial and early appeals, PTSD had
not yet been recognized as a clinically
identifiable disorder.433
In 1982, a psychologist and leading
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expert on PTSD examined Funchess in
prison and found that he suffered from
a particularly severe case of the disor-
der.434 According to the psychologist,
PTSD was produced by massive internal-
ized stress, which could erupt, on occa-
sion, into uncontrollable outbursts of
aggressive behavior.435
Factual investigation, conducted for
the first time by Funchess' newly-ap-
pointed post-conviction lawyers, 436 con-
firmed the origins and documented the
symptoms of the disorder. Family and
friends testified that:
[D] espite a very poor and often brutal
family background, [Funchess] had
been a quiet, intelligent and ambitious
teenager, who did well at school. He
joined the Marines shortly after gradu-
ating from high school, apparently be-
lieving that a career in the [military]
would enable him to progress in life.
Described by his sisters as having had a
bright and easygoing personality, he
returned from Vietnam "shell-
shocked." He was unable to tolerate
noise, suffered from frequent "flash-
backs," sleeplessness and recurring
nightmares. His family said that he
would not enter a house or room with-
out first crouching down with an imagi-
nary machine-gun as if ready for com-
bat. Unable to spend time indoors he
would often build what his sister de-
scribed as "foxholes" and sleep in them
under the house. Later he took to
sleeping in cars. His family and friends
believed that part of his drug addiction
was due to the continuing pain from his
war injury (prison medical records indi-
cate that he still suffered some pain
from this years later). Unable to find
regular employment after leaving the
[service], he drifted into vagrancy and
petty crime. 437
Funchess was executed on April 22,
1986.438
c. Arthur Frederick Goode
Arthur Frederick Goode began exhib-
iting symptoms of mental disturbance
when he was three years old. 439 By age
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fifteen, Goode was receiving injections
of Depo-Provera to help control his
sexual urges. By the time he turned
eighteen in 1972, Goode had been ar-
rested for pedophilia. 440 Eventually,
Goode was committed to a mental hospi-
tal, but he escaped in 1976 and fled to
Florida, where he raped, tortured, and
killed a ten-year-old boy. A psychiatrist
examined Goode before trial and found
him to be mentally incompetent. None-
theless, three court-appointed psychia-
trists found Goode competent and he
stood trial in 1977. Although Goode had
a court-appointed attorney, he repre-
sented himself at trial. Goode "brought
out evidence to assure his own convic-
tion, testified in gory detail as to his
guilt, and argued to the jury that he
should be convicted and sentenced to
death. '4 41 Goode got his wish.
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals expressed "serious doubts as
to Goode's competence," the court up-
held Goode's conviction and death sen-
tence. 442 Goode's severe mental impair-
ment persisted in prison.
The men who ran the prison agreed
that Goode was mad. "I saw Arthur
every month," warden Dave Brierton
said. "He would come in for a talk, and
it was always the same: He couldn't
understand why society didn't allow
him to have sex with boys. I tried
explaining the historical development
of sexual taboos, but it never sank in.
He would start crying and asking why
he couldn't have a boy in his cell. He
was one of a kind, impossible. 'So-
and-so didn't go to sleep last night,'
he'd say. Or, 'Your officer only checked
the cell block four times, not five.' Or, 'I
couldn't get Channel Six last night. I
got snow on my TV set.' One time he
comes in and says, 'I don't want to live
here anymore.' "
He didn't want to live there anymore.
Goode didn't get the picture, he missed
the point of punishment; as his father
put it, "He had no understanding."
That was the State's own test of suffi-
cient sanity to be executed. A prisoner
had to understand what was happening
to him and why. "I don't think Arthur
ever understood that when you're ex-
ecuted, we can't come back the next
day and talk about it," said Richard
Dugger, Brierton's successor as warden.
"It was like dealing with a child. He
could make a rational appearance. He
could answer your questions and ap-
pear to carry on a conversation. But he
just didn't understand what you were
saying. 443
Three court-appointed psychiatrists
found that Goode was mentally fit to be
executed, and he was electrocuted on
April 5, 1984. 444
d. Johnny Frank Garrett
At the age of seventeen, Johnny Frank
Garrett was convicted of capital murder
in Texas and sentenced to death.4 4 5 Af-
ter his arrival on death row in 1982 for a
crime he could not remember having
committed, Mr. Garrett was diagnosed
with paranoid schizophrenia; among his
symptoms were auditory and visual hallu-
cinations, including conversations with a
dead aunt.446 Uncontroverted evidence
indicated that Mr. Garrett had experi-
enced these psychotic symptoms since
childhood.447 During all but two months
of his entire nine-year period of incar-
ceration, prison doctors prescribed for
Mr. Garrett substantial doses of Stela-
zine, an antipsychotic drug.448
In 1986, Mr. Garrett was evaluated by
Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis, a psychiatrist
participating in a 1986 research project
on the characteristics of juveniles sen-
tenced to death in the United States.4 4 9
After performing a comprehensive ex-
amination of Mr. Garrett, Dr. Lewis con-
cluded that he was "one of the most
psychiatrically disturbed inmates [she]
had interviewed over the past 10
years."450
Dr. Lewis reevaluated Mr. Garrett in
1992, once again finding that he suf-
fered from auditory and visual hallucina-
tions, delusional beliefs, paranoid ide-
ation, and a sense of being controlled by


















state of Texas on
February 11,
1992.
outside forces.45' Dr. Lewis also diag-
nosed, for the first time, Mr. Garrett's
severe dissociative disorder, which re-
sulted from repeated sexual abuse he
endured as a young child. 452 This illness
apparently was made manifest through
Mr. Garrett's hallucinations and his regu-
lar conversations with his dead Aunt
Barbara. Moreover, Dr. Lewis found that
Mr. Garrett had multiple, independent
personalities and personality fragments,
an illness often produced by extreme
abuse-particularly of a sexual nature-
during childhood. 4
53
Windell L. Dickerson, Ph.D., a psy-
chologist and former head of Mental
Health Services at the Texas Depart-
ment of Corrections, came to similar
conclusions after examining Mr. Garrett
in 1986. Dr. Dickerson determined that
Johnny Garrett was "one of the most
pervasively psychological impaired indi-
viduals [he] had encountered in over 28
years of practice." 454 As reported by Dr.
Dickerson, Mr. Garrett's mental illness
included paranoid ideation, delusional
thought, and misinterpretation arising
from neurological limitations.455 Dr.
Dickerson also determined that along
with Mr. Garrett's hallucinations in which
he spoke with his dead Aunt Barbara,
Mr. Garrett also held the delusional
belief that this aunt would save him from
the effects of the lethal injection at his
execution. 456
Despite the arguments of his attorneys
that, among other things, Mr. Garrett's
severe mental illness prevented him from
adequately communicating with them
and understanding the nature of his
punishment, Johnny Frank Garrett was
executed by the state of Texas on Febru-
ary 11, 1992.
The ABA policy against executing
mentally retarded persons is based in
part on the fact that mentally retarded
persons have the mental ages of chil-
dren. Thus they are more vulnerable to
be led to falsely confess and are less
equipped to assist in their defense. As
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Judge Fitzpatrick observed in a capital
case:
No justification can be had for the
execution of a child of ten or eleven
years of age in any society that consid-
ers itself civilized. If a child of ten or
eleven should not be executed under
any circumstances, then surely a person
who may have a chronological age of
twenty, but a mental and emotional age
of ten or eleven, should not be put to
death. 457
The ABA policy on the execution of
juvenile offenders is discussed immedi-
ately below.
E Children Under the Age of 18 Are Being
Sentenced to Death and Executed.
1. The ABA Policy
Be It Resolved, That the American Bar
Association opposes, in principle, the
imposition of capital punishment upon
any person for any offense committed
while under the age of eighteen (18).
There are many reasons underlying
the ABA's position regarding the execu-
tion of juveniles. Children and adoles-
cents are widely recognized as less re-
sponsible for their actions than adults,
and more amenable to rehabilitation.458
Thus, the death penalty is particularly
inhuman as applied to juveniles.
In addition, other arguments typically
mustered in support of capital punish-
ment lose force when applied tojuvenile
offenders.
[C]hildren and adolescents are more
liable than adults to act on impulse, or
under the influence or domination of
others, with little thought for the long-
term consequences of their actions,
and they are unlikely to be deterred by
the penalty. Many young people who
commit brutal crimes themselves come
from brutalizing and deprived back-
grounds. To impose the death penalty
in such cases, whether as retribution or
as an intended deterrent, violates basic
principles of decency.459
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2. Historical Background of Capital
Punishment for Children
The historical background of capital
punishment for children predates colo-
nization. According to Professor Victor
Streib:
The United States inherited the bulk of
its criminal law, including the tradition
of capital punishment, primarily from
England but also from other European
countries. A fundamental premise of
this criminal jurisprudence was then
and is now that persons under age
seven were conclusively presumed to be
incapable of entertaining criminal in-
tent and thus could not have criminal
liability imposed upon them. For per-
sons from age seven to age fourteen,
the presumption of inability to enter-
tain criminal intent was rebuttable, and
if rebutted, such a person could be
convicted of a crime and be sentenced
to death. No such presumption applied
to persons age fourteen or over. This
view of children's liability in the crimi-
nal justice system was accepted by the
United States Supreme Court in In re
Gault [387 U.S. 1 (1967) ]: "At common
law, children under seven were consid-
ered incapable of possessing criminal
intent. Beyond that age, they were sub-
jected to arrest, trial, and in theory to
punishment like adult offenders [387
U.S. at 16 (1967)]."460
In 1983, the ABA reported that 191
juveniles had been executed in the
United States between 1900 and 1964.461
A twenty-one year moratorium on execut-
ing juveniles followed. However, execu-
tions ofjuveniles resumed in 1985462 and
have continued unabated since.
The role of evolving standards of de-
cency on the ability of states to sentence
juveniles to death was at the center of
two Supreme Court cases, decided in
consecutive Terms.
3. Thompson v. Oklahoma463 and
Stanford v. Kentucky464
In 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,465 a
bare plurality of the Supreme Court
held that the Constitution forbids the
execution of one who commits a capital
offense while under the age of six-
teen. 466 William Wayne Thompson was
sentenced to die for a murder commit-
ted when Thompson was fifteen years
old. Along with three adult men, Thomp-
son kidnaped and then killed Charles
Keene, Thompson's former brother-in-
law, who had been abusing Keene's
former wife, Thompson's half-sister.
467
Thompson was certified to stand trial as
an adult as permitted by an Oklahoma
statute. 468 Relying on many of the same
reasons that undergird the ABA resolu-
tion against the execution of persons
under age eighteen,469 the Thompson
plurality found that the execution of
someone who commits a capital offense
under sixteen years of age is "nothing
more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering" and is
therefore unconstitutional.4
70
The following Term, the Court held in
Stanford v. Kentucky471 that the Eighth
Amendment did not prohibit the execu-
tion of an individual who committed a
capital offense at sixteen years of age.
Kevin Stanford was approximately seven-
teen years and four months old when he
committed murder. Stanford, like
Thompson, was certified to stand trial as
an adult, and was convicted and sen-
tenced to die.4 72 Stanford's case was
consolidated with that of Heath Wilkins,
who at age sixteen committed a murder
to which he later pleaded guilty.473
Wilkins was likewise certified as an adult
and was sentenced to death.4 74
Thus, Supreme Court precedent,
which draws the line of death eligibility
at age sixteen, squarely conflicts with
ABA policy, which draws the line at age
eighteen. According to the most recent
statistics available, forty juvenile offend-
ers currently await execution in this
country.
4 75
4. Modern Executions ofjuveniles
Notwithstanding ABA policy, since
1972, nine juveniles condemned to die
for crimes committed while under age





















eighteen have been put to death. 47 6 Of
the forty jurisdictions that permit capital
punishment, fourteen have selected age
eighteen as the minimum age for death
eligibility.4 77 Five others have selected
age seventeen. 478 Twenty-one death pen-
alty jurisdictions (fifty-two percent) per-
mit the execution of sixteen-year-olds.
479
Consequently, twenty-six out of forty
death penalty jurisdictions (sixty-five per-
cent) are not in compliance with the
ABA policy.
5. Examples of Children Who
Have Been Executed
On September 11, 1985, Texas be-
came the first state to execute ajuvenile
in this country since 1964.480 Charles
Rumbaugh had been sentenced to death
for a crime committed while he was
seventeen years old.481 After more than
eight years on death row, Rumbaugh
dropped his final appeals and died by
lethal injection. 482
The next juvenile to be executed,
James Terry Roach, died in South Caroli-
na's electric chair onJanuary 10, 1986.483
In 1977, at age seventeen, Roach pleaded
guilty to the murders of two white teenag-
ers. An older codefendant, also sen-
tenced to die, was executed in January
1985. A third codefendant who, like
Roach, was ajuvenile when the murders
occurred, turned in state's evidence and
was rewarded with a life sentence. 484
Although the trial judge found that
Roach acted under the domination of
his older codefendant, and despite psy-
chiatric evidence that Roach had the
mental age of a twelve-year-old and suf-
fered a personality disorder, he was sen-
tenced to death.485
Several weeks before Roach was ex-
ecuted, a neurologist discovered that
Roach exhibited symptoms of Hunting-
ton's Disease, a hereditary illness that
causes mental deterioration. 486 Expert
testimony established that this disease,
which was not detected at the time of
Roach's trial, could well have affected
his mental state when the crime was
committed.487 Seven otherjuveniles have
been put to death in this country since
1985.488
6. International Treaties and Norms
Toward the end ofJames Terry Roach's
appeals, his attorneys raised objections
to his execution under international law.
For example, a complaint filed with the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (LACHR) alleged that Roach's
execution would violate the obligations
of the United States under international
customary law and the human rights
charter of the Organization of American
States (OAS). 4 89
The Commission asked the U.S. gov-
ernment and the Governor of South
Carolina to grant Roach a stay of execu-
tion while the complaint was being con-
sidered.4 90 Similarly, on January 9, 1986,
the General Secretary of the OAS ap-
pealed to the Governor of South Caro-
lina to "follow the current tendency of
almost all countries of this hemisphere"
and stay Roach's execution. 49 ' Both re-
quests failed, and Roach was put to
death.
Although Roach's appeal to the U.S.
government and the Governor of South
Carolina fell on deaf ears, it is evident
that the execution of juveniles is an
aberration in the international commu-
nity and is contrary to international
law.49 2 As of 1991, only seven countries
were known to have executed juveniles
in recent history.493 These countries in-
clude: Barbados, which executed one
juvenile and has since raised the mini-
mum age for executions to eighteen;
Nigeria, which executed one juvenile;
Pakistan, which executed three young
people; Bangladesh, which executed one
juvenile, although the government dis-
putes the age of the person executed;
and the United States, which leads the
group with its execution of four young
people.494 Iran and Iraq also have ex-
ecuted an undetermined number of
young people.495
The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) 49 6 prohib-
its the imposition of the death penalty
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on persons who commit a death-eligible
offense when they were under the age of
eighteen. On June 8, 1992, the United
States ratified the ICCPR but with cer-
tain reservations, understandings, decla-
rations, and provisos. 497 In ratifying the
ICCPR, the United States specifically
rejected the ICCPR's prohibition of the
executions of juveniles. This rejection
places the United States not only at odds
with international law and treaties, but
also places the United States outside the
norm of recognized international hu-
man rights.
III. PROPOSAL THAT THERE BE A
MORATORIUM ON THE IMPOSITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
The language of the ABA's Final Reso-
lution, as adopted February 3, 1997, by a
vote of 280 to 119, follows:
RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, that the American Bar
Association calls upon each jurisdiction
that imposes capital punishment not to
carry out the death penalty until the
jurisdiction implements policies and pro-
cedures that are consistent with the fol-
lowing longstanding American Bar Asso-
ciation policies intended to (1) ensure
that death penalty cases are adminis-
tered fairly and impartially, in accor-
dance with due process, and (2) mini-
mize the risk that innocent persons may
be executed:
(i) Implementing ABA "Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases"
(adopted Feb. 1989) and Association
policies intended to encourage com-
petency of counsel in capital cases
(adopted Feb. 1979, Feb. 1988, Feb.
1990, Aug. 1996);
(ii) Preserving, enhancing, and streamlin-
ing state and federal courts' author-
ity and responsibility to exercise inde-
pendent judgment on the merits of
constitutional claims in state post-
conviction and federal habeas corpus
proceedings (adopted Aug. 1982,
Feb. 1990);
(iii)Striving to eliminate discrimination
in capital sentencing on the basis of
the race of either the victim or the
defendant (adopted Aug. 1988, Aug.
1991); and
(iv) Preventing execution of mentally re-
tarded persons (adopted Feb. 1989)
and persons who were under the age
of 18 at the time of their offenses
(adopted Aug. 1983).
FURTHER RESOLVED, That in adopt-
ing this recommendation, apart from
existing Association policies relating to
offenders who are mentally retarded or
under the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the offenses, the Associa-










REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES
RECOMMENDATIONS
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American
Bar Association urges that the following
measures be taken in the litigation of
death penalty cases:
(1) Because the defects and delays in
habeas corpus procedure are due
to the fact that the accused was not
represented by competent coun-
sel, particularly at the trial level,
the state and federal governments
should be obligated to provide com-
petent and adequately compen-
sated counsel for capital defen-
dants/appellants/petitioners, as
well as to provide sufficient re-


























the trial of such
cases.
sources for investigation, expert wit-
nesses, and other services, at all
stages of capital punishment litiga-
tion. The American Bar Associa-
tion Guidelines for the Appoint-
ment and Performance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases should gov-
ern the appointment and compen-
sation of counsel.
(2) The individual or organization re-
sponsible for appointing counsel
should enlist the assistance of the
local bar association and resource
center to seek the best qualified
attorneys available.
(3) Jurisdictions that have the death
penalty should establish and fund
organizations to recruit, select,
train, monitor, support, and assist
attorneys involved at all stages of
capital litigation and, if necessary,
to participate in the trial of such
cases.
(4) New counsel should be appointed
to represent the death-sentenced
inmate for the state direct appeal
unless the appellant requests the
continuation of trial counsel after
having been fully advised of the
consequences of his or her deci-
sion, and the appellant waives the
right to new counsel on the record.
(5) To avoid the delay occasioned by
the appointment of new counsel
for post-conviction proceedings and
to assure continued competent rep-
resentation, state appellate counsel
who represented a death-sentenced
inmate should continue representa-
tion through all subsequent state,
federal, and United States Su-
preme Court proceedings.
(6) To assure that the state provides
competent representation and to
avoid procedural delays as well as
multiple review of the same issues,
the following procedural barriers
to federal habeas corpus review
should not apply with respect to
any state court proceeding at which
the state court, in deprivation of
the right to counsel recognized in
paragraph "1" above, failed to ap-
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point competent and adequately
compensated counsel to represent
the defendant/appellant/peti-
tioner:
(a) exhaustion of state judicial
remedies;
(b) procedural default rules; and
(c) the presumption of correct-
ness of state court findings of
fact.
(7) Federal courts should not rely on
state procedural bar rules to pre-
clude consideration of the merits
of a claim if the prisoner shows that
the failure to raise the claim in a
state court was due to the igno-
rance or neglect of the prisoner or
counsel or if the failure to consider
such a claim would result in a
miscarriage ofjustice.
(8) State appellate courts should re-
view under a knowing, understand-
ing, and voluntary waiver standard
all claims of constitutional error
not properly raised at trial and on
appeal and should have a plain
error rule and apply it liberally
with respect to errors of state law.
(9) On the initial state post-conviction
application, state post-conviction
courts should review under a know-
ing, understanding, and voluntary
waiver standard all claims of consti-
tutional error not properly pre-
served at trial or on appeal.
(10) The federal courts should adopt
rules designed to facilitate both
the presentation of all available
claims in the first habeas corpus
petition and the prompt exhaus-
tion of any unexhausted claims in
order to eliminate the problem of
procedurally forced successive pe-
titions.
(11) A rational process of review will
be facilitated by a stay of execu-
tion that remains in force until
the completion of the initial
round of state and federal post-
conviction review. Therefore, un-
less the state courts grant a stay of
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execution, the federal courts, in
preservation of their habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction, should grant a
stay of execution to run from the
initiation of state post-conviction
proceedings through the comple-
tion for the initial round of fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings,
and should be empowered to do
SO.
(12) The petitioner should have a right
of appeal from denial of an initial
federal habeas corpus petition
without the need to obtain a cer-
tificate of probable cause.
(13) A one-year limitations period
should be employed as a substi-
tute mechanism to move the case
toward reasonably prompt comple-
tion, but only with adequate and
sufficient tolling provisions to per-
mit full and fair consideration of
a petitioner's claims in state court,
federal court, and the United
States Supreme Court. The sanc-
tion for failure to comply with the
time requirements should be dis-
missal, except that the time re-
quirements should be waived
where the petitioner has pre-
sented a colorable claim, which
has not been presented previ-
ously, either of factual innocence
or of the petitioner's ineligibility
for the death penalty.
(14) A federal court should entertain a
second or successive petition for
habeas corpus relief if:
(a) the request for relief is based
on a claim not previously pre-
sented by the prisoner in the state
and federal courts and the failure
to raise the claim is the result of
state action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United
States, the result of Supreme
Court recognition of a new fed-
eral right that is retroactively appli-
cable, or based on a factual predi-
cate that could not have been
discovered through the exercise
of reasonable diligence; or
(b) the facts underlying the claim
would be sufficient, if proven, to
undermine the court's confidence
in thejury's determination of guilt
on the offense or offenses for
which the death penalty was im-
posed; or
(c) consideration of the re-
quested relief is necessary to pre-
vent a miscarriage ofjustice.
(15) The standard for determining
whether changes in federal consti-
tutional law should apply retroac-
tively should be whether failure to
apply the new law would under-
mine the accuracy of either the
guilt or the sentencing determina-
tion.
(16) To afford the states a reasonable
time to adopt and implement
rules and procedures pursuant to
these Recommendations, the pro-
posed federal statutory and rule
changes should take effect upon
adoption by the states of provi-
sions in accordance with these
Recommendations, but not later
than two years from the date of
enactment of federal legislation.
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reveal the dirty little secret that the death penalty
hinders the fight against crime); see also Robert M.
Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at A25.
19 Morgenthau, supra note 18, at A25. Prosecutor
Morgenthau wrote to explain his opposition to
the reinstatement of capital punishment in New
York. Morgenthau explained that when he be-
came District Attorney in 1975, there were 648
homicides in Manhattan. In 1994, there were 330.
"The number has been cut virtually in half
without executions-proof to me that they are
not needed to continue that trend." Id.
20 Nat Hentoff, A Prosecutor Who Boycotts the Death
Penalty, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1995, at A15. District
Attorney Johnson has paid dearly for his opposi-
tion to the death penalty. Ultimately, New York
Governor Pataki called for Johnson to seek the
death penalty in the Gillespie case, which in-
volved the murder of a police officer. Upon
Johnson's refusal, Pataki replaced Johnson as
District Attorney, an action for which he was
much criticized. Statement by American Jewish Con-
gress on Decision by Governor Pataki to Remove Bronx
D.A. Over Death Penalty, PR NEWSwiRE, Mar. 21,
1996, at Domestic News.
21 Habeas Corpus Appeals of State Death Sentences,
Restrictions: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Const. Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S.
House of Representatives, 102d Cong. at 447 (state-
ment of John J. Curtin, Jr., former ABA presi-
dent) (1991).
22 Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sen-
tences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 332-33 (1995) (foot-
notes omitted) [hereinafter Vick, Underfunded
Indigent Defense].
Professors Carol S. Steiker andJordan M. Steiker
provide the following assessment of modern death
penaltyjurisprudence:
Virtually no one thinks that the constitu-
tional regulation of capital punishment has
been a success. But oddly, and we think
significantly, critics of the Court's death pen-
alty jurisprudence fall into two diametrically
opposed camps. On the one hand, some
critics claim that the Court's work has bur-
dened the administration of capital punish-
ment with an overly complex, absurdly ar-
cane, and minutely detailed body of
constitutional law that, in the words of
Learned Hand in a slightly different context,
"obstructs, delays, and defeats" the adminis-
tration of capital punishment. This set of
critics notes the sheer volume of death pen-
alty litigation, the labyrinthine nature of the
doctrines that such litigation has spawned,
the frequency with which federal courts over-
turn state-imposed death sentences, and the
lengthy delays that occur between the imposi-
tion of death sentences and their execution.
On the other hand, a different set of critics
claims that the Supreme Court has in fact
turned its back on regulating the death
penalty and no longer even attempts to meet
the concerns about the arbitrary and discrimi-
natory imposition of death that animated its
"constitutionalization" of capital punish-
ment in Furman. These critics note that the
Court's intervention has done little or noth-
ing to remedy the vast overrepresentation on
death row of the young, poor, and mentally
retarded or the continuing influence of race
on the capital sentencing decision. Under
this view, in the anguished words of Justice
Blackmun, who twenty years after his dissent
in Furman radically changed course and ar-
gued for the abolition of the death penalty
altogether under the Eighth Amendment,
the Court has done no more than "tinker
with the machinery of death."
[W]e conclude that both sets of criticisms of
the Court's work are substantially correct:
the death penalty is, perversely, both over-
and under-regulated. The body of doctrine
produced by the Court is enormously com-
plex and its applicability to specific cases
difficult to discern; yet, it remains unrespon-
sive to the central animating concerns that
inspired the Court to embark on its regula-
tory regime in the first place. Indeed, most
surprisingly, the overall effect of twenty-odd
years of doctrinal head-banging has been to
substantially reproduce the pre-Furman world
of capital sentencing.
Steiker &-Steiker, supra note 10, at 357-59 (foot-
notes omitted).
23 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari); JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. Pow-
ELL,JR.: A BIOGRAPHY. 451-52 (1994).
24 See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text.
25 Douglas W. Vick recently suggested that full
implementation of the procedural and substan-
tive protections erected by the Supreme Court in
capital cases might achieve the same result. Vick
concluded, however, that these procedural and
substantive protections-much like the ABA poli-
cies and recommendations-are rarely imple-
mented. Vick, Underfunded Indigent Defense, supra
note 22, at 333.
26 See infta section II.
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27 This section draws in large part upon RANDALL
COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 51-52, 91-121 (1994).
28 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
29 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
30 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
31 Id. at 87-88.
32 Id. at 99.
3 Id. at 100-01.
34 Id. at 101.
5 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:
THE DEATH PENALTY 16 (1994).
36402 U.S. 183 (1971).
37 Id. at 196.
-8 Id. at 204.
39 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
40 Id. at 239.
41 Id. at 238.
42 Id. at 239-40. Although the judgment of the
Court was announced in a terse per curiam
opinion, all nine justices wrote opinions setting
forth their disparate views on the subject. Justices
Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death
penalty was unconstitutional regardless of how it
was administered. According to Justice Brennan:
Death is an unusually severe and degrading
punishment; there is a strong probability
that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by
contemporary society is virtually total; and
there is no reason to believe that it serves any
penal purpose more effectively than the less
severe punishment of imprisonment. The
function of these principles is to enable a
court to determine whether a punishment
comports with human dignity. Death, quite
simply, does not.
Id. at 305.
Justice Marshall found that the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment on
two independent grounds. First, "it is excessive
and serves no valid legislative purpose." Injustice
Marshall's view, the death penalty was no more
effective a deterrent than life imprisonment.
Second, Justice Marshall considered the death
penalty to be "abhorrent to currently existing
moral values." Id. at 331-33, 357-60.
The other three members of the Furman majority,
Justices Stewart, Douglas, and White, agreed that
the systems of capital punishment then in exis-
tence were unconstitutional. However, these jus-
tices reserved judgment on whether capital pun-
ishment could be constitutionally administered
under some other system.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion focused on
the discriminatory effect of the discretionary
statutes. He wrote: "[T]hese discretionary stat-
utes are unconstitutional in their operation. They
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimina-
tion is an ingredient not compatible with the idea
of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in
the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id.
at 256-57.
4s428 U.S. 153 (1976).
44 Id. at 188.
45Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisi-
ana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
46 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204.
47 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
48 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
49 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
50 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
51 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258.
52 These capital offenses are: [1] "murder of a
peace officer or fireman; [2] murder committed
in the course of kidnapping [sic], burglary, rob-
bery, forcible rape or arson; [3] murder commit-
ted for remuneration; [4] murder committed
while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution; and [5] murder committed by a
prison inmate when the victim is a prison em-
ployee." During the guilt and innocence stage of
the capital trial, the jury is required to determine
whether the state proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed one of the
enumerated capital offenses. Jurek, 428 U.S. at
268-69.
51 If the jury found the defendant guilty of a
capital offense, Texas required the jury, in a
separate sentencing proceeding, to answer three
questions to determine whether a defendant
would be allowed to live in prison or be put to
death:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant
that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with
the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another
would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in re-
sponse to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711 (West
1997).
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54Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 271.
57 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
58 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
59 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
60 Id. at 302.
61 Id. at 303.
62 Id. at 302 (citing the conclusions of a NORTH
CAROLINA COMMISSION REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMISSION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, NORTH CAROLINA POPULAR
GOVERNMENT 13 (1949)).
63 Id. at 303.
64 Id. at 304.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 305.
67 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, J.,
joined by Powell and Stevens,JJ.).
68 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952-53
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari).
69 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). In a recent Harvard Law Review article,
Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker analyzed
the Court's expressed concern for "heightened
reliability" in capital cases. According to the
article, "taken together with the cases elaborating
the requirement of individualized sentencing,"
the following decisions represent the sum total of
the Court's applications of the death-is-different
doctrine:
The Court has invoked the notion of height-
ened reliability to permit voir dire concern-
ing racial prejudice in cases involving interra-
cial murders [Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28,
37 (1986)]; to invalidate a death sentence
based in part on a pre-sentence report that
was not made available to defense counsel
[Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-62
(1977) ]; to prevent prosecutors from deliber-
ately misleading jurors about the conse-
quences of their decision by misstating the
scope of appellate review [Caldwell v. Missis-
sippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-30 (1985)]; to re-
quire the inclusion of a lesser-included of-
fense instruction in cases in which the
evidence would support a guilty verdict for a
non-capital offense [Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980)]; and to permit the
defendant to inform the jury of the real
consequences of a "life" sentence when the
state argues that the defendant would be
dangerous in the future and "life" means life
without possibility of parole as a matter of
state law [Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.
Ct. 2187, 2193-94 (1994)]. The Court also
has invoked the "death is different" doctrine
in post-trial proceedings to overturn a sen-
tence based on a prior conviction that was
later invalidated [Johnson v. Mississippi, 486
U.S. 578, 584-87 (1988)], and to suggest that
some post-trial judicial consideration of
newly-discovered evidence of innocence may
be mandated when the inmate makes a
"truly persuasive" showing of actual (as op-
posed to legal) innocence [Herrera v. Col-
lins, 506 U.S. 390, 417].
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 397.
71 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1132-33 (Black-
mun,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
71 Id.
72 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
73 Id. at 604-05 (emphasis in original).
74 Id.
75 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
76 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
77 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
78 THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1990), supra note 3,
at 15. Later that same year, the National Law
Journal (NLJ) published the results of a compre-
hensive six-month, six-state study of capital de-
fense in the South. After examining thousands of
pages of trial transcripts in nearly 100 capital
cases; conducting in-depth interviews with scores
of attorneys who tried and lost capital cases; and
questioning judges, prosecutors and experts in
capital cases; the NLJ reported the following "key
findings":
The trial lawyers who represented death row
inmates in the six states [Alabama, Georgia,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas]
have been disbarred, suspended or other-
wise disciplined at a rate three to 46 times the
discipline rate for those states.
More than half the defense counsel ques-
tioned in an NLJ survey said they were
handling their first capital trials when their
clients, now on death row, were convicted.
Wholly unrealistic statutory fee limits on
defense representation-such as Mississip-
pi's flat, unwaivable $1,000 cap, equivalent to
a fee of about $5 per hour for many lawyers-
act as disincentives to thorough trial investiga-
tion and preparation.
Inadequate or non-existent standards for
appointment of counsel can result, for ex-
ample, in an oil and gas lawyer handling a
capital trial as his or her first criminal case.
Statutory standards that do exist for appoint-
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ment of counsel are routinely ignored by
trial judges and violations are viewed on
appeal as "harmless error."
Capital trials often are completed in one to
two days-in contrast to the two-week to
two-month trials in some regions where so-
phisticated indigent defense systems oper-
ate.
Penalty phases-the capital trial's most impor-
tant part-usually start immediately after a
guilty verdict and last only several hours and
in at least one case just 15 minutes.
Little effort-and in at least one-fourth of
the cases the NLJ examined, no effort-was
expended to present mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase.
Judges routinely deny lawyers' requests for
expert/investigative fees.
State criminal justice systems are ill-equipped
to deal with mentally ill or retarded defen-
dants unable to aid their defense attorneys.
And finally, compounding all of these prob-
lems, the U.S. Supreme Court decision that
lays out the test for ineffective assistance of
counsel is itself ineffective, according to capi-
tal law experts and defense lawyers. The test
has made it all but impossible for death-
sentenced inmates to challenge the perfor-
mance of their trial lawyers.
Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in
the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L L.J.,June 11, 1990, at
30.
79 GUIDELINES, supra note 3.
80 Id. at 3. A rare example of a jurisdiction
adopting at least some of the ABA Guidelines is
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4393-94 (1988) (codified
at 21 U.S.C. section 848(q)); see also Crime Con-
trol Act of 1994, 21 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. (1994).
81 GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 79.
82 ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.2
(3d ed. 1991).
8 3 
AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN
CAPITAL CASES, REPORT ON HABEAS CORPUS IN
CAPITAL CASES, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239
(Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter POWELL COMM. REP.].
84 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1035, 1040 (1989).
85 POWELL COMM. REP., supra note 83, at 4.
"Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 1015, 1057 (1993). As Chief Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., of the Third Circuit observed:
"[i]t is at the trial and direct appeal stage-not in
state collateral proceedings-where ineffectual
counsel do the most damage to their clients'
rights and to the integrity of the judicial process."
Id. at 1057-58. More recently, Judge Joseph W.
Bellacosa of the New York Court of Appeals noted
that there is "a death row counsel crisis in this
country." Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses
From the Death Penalty: "Old Sparky's "Jolt to the Legal
Profession, 14 PACE L. REv. 1, 13 (1994).
87466 U.S. 668 (1984).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 687.
90 Id. at 694.
91 Id. at 696. An attorney's errors do not violate
the right to counsel unless the attorney's perfor-
mance as a whole falls outside the "wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689.
Under Strickland, courts must 'judge ... coun-
sel's challenged conduct on the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's
conduct." Id. at 690.
92 Id. at 689.
91 Id. at 707.
94 Id. at 710-11.
95 Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir.
1986) (Rubin,J., concurring).
96 For a sampling of various horror stories regard-
ing counsel in capital cases, see infra sections
II.A.6 and II.A.7.
97 Stephen B. Bright, et al., Keeping Gideon From
Being Blown Away: Prospective Challenges to Inad-
equate Representation May Be Our Best Hope, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 1990, at 11.
98 Two justices of the Florida Supreme Court
would have held that Moran was ineffective dur-
ing trial. Coyle et al., supra note 78, at 30.
99 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
100 Id. at 380 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 372.
102 A recent ABA-sponsored symposium addressed
the political pressures that confront elected state
judges who overturn death sentences because of
serious constitutional errors. Symposium, Politics
and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. During that
program, James Exum, Jr., Chief Justice of the
North Carolina Supreme Court, described how
the way he voted in capital cases became a central
issue during the judicial elections. Id. at 270-73.
13 ABA, Report of the Comm'n on Professionalism,
112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986).
104 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995)
(Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
105 Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Keenan, Judges
and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of
Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B. U.
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L. REv. 759, 760, 765 (1995) (documenting case
after case in which "judges who do not listen and
bend to political pressures" have lost their posi-
tions on the bench).
106 Id. at 779 nn.88-89.
107 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (revers-
ing because of racial discrimination injury selec-
tion); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 32 (1932)
(reversing because the accused were denied coun-
sel).
108 Bright & Keenan, supra note 105, at 765 n.32.
09 Id.
I10 See generally id.
11 Id. at 760-61.
112 Id. at 761.
113 Id. "A law professor who watches the court
observed, 'One thing it shows is that when the
voters speak loudly enough, even the judiciary
listens.' " Id. (quoting Professor Clark Kelso)
(citation omitted).
114 See generally id.
115 Id. at 834 (footnote omitted).
116 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concur-
ring). In his opinion, White concludes that in our
system of criminal justice, in which one primary
goal of punishment is specific deterrence of
future similar conduct by other individuals, the
infrequency with which the death penalty is
imposed has all but nullified its intended effects.
This phenomenon, White felt, emerged from the
sentencing authority of juries, where community
judgment comes to bear in "mitigat[ing] the
harshness of the law." Given this rationale, White
stated that "[a] penalty with such negligible
returns to the State would be patently excessive
and cruel and unusual punishment violative of
the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 311-13.
117 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The
Death Sentence not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Bright, Counselfor the Poor]. Consider the effect
inadequate representation had in the conviction
and execution of Horace Dunkins:
[T]he failure of defense counsel to present
critical information is one reason that Hor-
ace Dunkins was sentenced to death in Ala-
bama. Before his execution in 1989, when
newspapers reported that Dunkins was men-
tally retarded, at least one juror came for-
ward and said she would not have voted for
the death sentence if she had known of his
condition. Nevertheless, Dunkins was ex-
ecuted.
Id. at 1837 (citation omitted).
118 Id. at 1849. "Only 11 of the 36 states which
have the death penalty have statewide public
defender programs." (citing SPANGENBERG GROUP,
supra note 7, at 157).
119 Id. at 1849-50.
120 Id. at 1850.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1851-52 (citations omitted). Consider
the following description of the current system of
indigent defense:
The structure of indigent defense not only
varies among states, it varies within many
states from county to county. Some localities
employ a combination of these programs. All
of these approaches have several things in
common. They evince the gross underfund-
ing that pervades indigent defense. They are
unable to attract and keep experienced and
qualified attorneys because of lack of com-
pensation and overwhelming workloads. Just
when lawyers reach the point when they have
handled enough cases to begin avoiding
basic mistakes, they leave criminal practice
and are replaced by other young, inexperi-
enced lawyers who are even less able to deal
with the overwhelming caseloads. Generally,
no standards are employed for assignment of
cases to counsel or for the performance of
counsel. And virtually no resources are pro-
vided for investigative and expert assistance
or defense counsel training. The situation
has further deteriorated in the last few years.
This is largely due to the increased complex-
ity of cases and the increase in the number of
cases resulting from expanded resources for
police and prosecution and the lack of a
similar increase, and perhaps even a decline,
in funding for defense programs.
It should be obvious that even if experienced
and competent counsel are available in capi-
tal cases, inadequate representation can still
result due to inadequate funding. Ample
funds are essential, not just to cover the
reasonable cost of attorneys' fees, but to pay
for critical services rendered by investigators
and experts.
Nationwide, examples of inadequate fund-
ing abound. Attorneys appointed to repre-
sent capital defendants in certain rural coun-
ties in Texas receive no more than $800 for
their services.
Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star
Counsel NAT'L L.J.,June 11, 1990, at 3.
An Alabama attorney appointed to represent a
capital defendant in a widely publicized case in
Alabama was allotted $500 for his services and
those of investigators and experts. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor, supra note 117, at 1847 (citing Deposi-
tion of Richard Bell, Grayson v. State (Cir. Ct.
Shelby County, Ala., Oct. 10, 1991) at 24-25). In
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Virginia, the hourly rate for capital defense ser-
vices averages about $13. Richard Klein, The
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not be Compelled
to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counse 68 IND.
L.J. 363, 366 (1993).
123 SPANGENBERG GRoup, supra note 7.
124 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985). The Circuit
court, in applying the test enunciated in Strickland
v. Washington, upheld the district court ruling that
Shirley Tyler received ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to present mitigating evidence
at the sentencing phase. The two-part test an-
nounced in Strickland first asks, "did counsel in
fact render a deficient performance?" The Su-
preme Court said that this "test must be whether
counsel's conduct fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness." "In order to make the
second determination, it must be shown that the
acts of counsel that were outside the range of
competence were actually prejudicial." Id. at 744.
125 954 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 507 U.S.
1026 (1993), on remand 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.
1994). Defendant appealed, citing numerous er-
rors relating to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Circuit Court, after conducting a de novo
review of this Sixth Amendment issue, found that
"Paradis has failed to demonstrate that his trial
counsel's performance was ineffective because of
his inexperience." While recognizing that coun-
sel had been admitted to the bar only six months
before the murder trial, the Circuit Court noted
that counsel "had been a police officer for many
years before he attended law school. [Counsel]
had extensive background in law enforcement
investigations and the court system. The record
also shows that [counsel] had previously tried
some misdemeanor cases for the prosecutor's
office." Id. at 491.
126 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 843 (1983). "[Defendant] argue[d on ap-
peal] that his trial counsel was unqualified be-
cause he had never defended a criminal case all
the way to ajury verdict and because he had only
recently graduated from law school." Id. at 1008.
The circuit court affirmed the district court's
rejection of the defendant's argument. The cir-
cuit court noted that "a defendant is not entitled
to 'errorless counsel,' but to 'counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effec-
tive assistance.' " Id. (citing Washington v. Wat-
kins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1356 (5th Cir. 1981)). Addi-
tionally, the court noted that defense counsel had
interned in the district attorney's office as a law
student, had handled criminal cases for a re-
spected law firm, had previously worked on a
number of civil cases, and had enlisted the help of
two experienced criminal lawyers while preparing
defendant's case. Id. at 1008-09.
127 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989).
128 581 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), rev'd,
581 So. 2d 531 (Ala. Crim. App.), on remand, 581
So. 2d 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
129 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 954 (1993). The court of appeals found that
defense counsel's reliance on an unconstitutional
death penalty statute during the penalty phase
constituted ineffective assistance under the first
prong of the Strickland test: "petitioner must show
that ... the attorney's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness." 1d. at
358. However, the court noted that petitioner's
argument failed prong two of the Strickland test in
that it demonstrated no actual prejudice.
[W]e simply cannot conclude that there is
any "reasonable probability" that, with effec-
tive assistance of counsel, Frey's jury would
have found that the balance of mitigating
and aggravating factors tipped the other way.
[Defense counsel's] misstatements about the
statute were corrected. All the evidence was
before the jury, which was properly in-
structed .... [T]he jury concluded that the
mitigating factors paled in comparison to the
horrible nature of the contract killing.
Id. at 369.
130 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990) (per curiam). The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the defendant
had received ineffective assistance of counsel,
citing numerous problems with the defense team
and the defenses presented at trial. Among those
factors found dispositive to its ruling were the
following:
(1) "Indicating its belief that [retained coun-
sel's] advanced age made him unable to
handle the unified appeal procedure,
the trial court appointed an attorney to
assist."
(2) The two defense attorneys never dis-
cussed their theory of the case until after
the state had rested its case in chief.
(3) Retained counsel placed defendant on
the stand without any preparation for
examination and over objection of ap-
pointed counsel. Defendant subse-
quently contradicted eyewitness and cir-
cumstantial evidence linking him to the
crimes.
(4) Defense attorneys presented mutually
exclusive defense theories during clos-
ing arguments: Retained counsel "asked
the jury to acquit based on reasonable
doubt that petitioner committed the
crimes, while appointed counsel contin-
ued to advance two theories involving
mental illness as well as arguing the
sufficiency of the evidence."
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Id. at 245.
131 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1012 (1990). The circuit court observed that
the district court found that defendant was de-
nied effective assistance of counsel.
The federal district court rested its grant of
relief upon the failure of [defense counsel]
to offer more extensive argument. The court
was persuaded that "the decision to not
present a more extensive argument at punish-
ment 'precluded the jury from considering
any mitigating factors;' [for example, that
defendant was a teenager, that he was intoxi-
cated at the time of the offense, and that his
violent family background might have made
his acts justifiable].... Finally, it concluded
that there was "a reasonable probability that
absent this deficiency, the jury would have
sentenced [defendant] to life imprisonment
rather than death." The district court then
ordered that the death sentence be "com-
muted to life imprisonment."
Id. at 876.
132 The circuit court reversed the district court,
reinstating the death sentence. The court based
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Delegates, Aug. 1982) (voting 116 to 98 to ap-
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212 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
213 Id. at 105. "Neither this nor any other court of
the United States, or judge thereof, can issue a
habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner, who is in
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221 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2789
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ing importance of federal habeas corpus in cor-
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Id.
222 Id. at 2789 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). More-
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in federal habeas corpus proceedings." Id. See
generally, The Crisis in Capital Representation, supra
note 161, at 32-41. "Reports illustrate the range
and variety of substantive claims in more than 250
cases in which federal habeas corpus relief was
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224 See infra section II.C.6 and II.C.7.
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stances of egregious constitutional error in the
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230 Id. at 5.
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character of ... last minute . .. reviews in death
penalty cases," because they "present unique
problems and require special solutions." Id. at 5.
232 Id. at 45 n.121. These hearings were held in
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(San Francisco), and August (Atlanta). Id. Follow-
ing each regional hearing, the Task Force met as a
deliberative body. In addition, the Task Force
convened on three other occasions. These addi-
tional meetings took place in Washington D.C.
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October 1989). Id. at 46 n.123.
233 Id. at 45-46.
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Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
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236 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 119-20. For example, Caprice Cosper, an
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that the setting of execution dates "is perhaps the
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administration of capital habeas cases in Texas....
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239 Id. at 26-27.
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241 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
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part, to the doctrine of Fay v. Noia. 372 U.S. 391
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to comply with state procedural rules in raising
claims of error could nonetheless seek relief in
federal court based on those same claims, pro-
vided that the prisoner did not "deliberately
bypass" the state procedure. Beginning with Wain-
wright v. Sykes, the Court retreated from the
deliberate bypass rule and significantly increased
the burden on all inmates seeking to avoid
application of the procedural default doctrine.
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty
Features
Report Regarding Implementation of the ABA's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty
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with the state procedure and actual "prejudice"
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243 Successive petitions are governed by Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1994 &
Supp. 1996) and Rule 9(b), Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
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245 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
246 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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onerous standard than the harmless error test of
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967),
which applies to errors raised at trial or on direct
appeal. Under Chapman, the beneficiary of the
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J. Foley, An Overview of the State's Affirmative De-
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CHAMPION, at 39 (May 1994).
253 489 U.S. at 301.
254 Vick, Underfunded Indigent Defense, supra note
22, at 419. AsJustice Brennan noted in his dissent,
"[flew decisions on appeal or collateral review
are 'dictated' by what came before. Most such
cases involve a question of law that is at least
debatable." Teague, 489 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
255 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Civil
and Const. Rights of the House Comm. On the Judi-
ciary, 102d Cong. 445-501 (1991) (statement of
John R. Curtin, Jr., president, ABA, and James S.
Liebman, professor of law, Columbia University
School of Law) for statements by ABA President
Curtin urging Congress to overrule Teague, at
least in capital cases. The ABA has not been alone
in urging that Teague be legislatively overruled.
Former ChiefJudge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Donald P. Lay, has
stated:
There are many criticisms of Teague. For one,
the new principles of retroactivity have
spawned a debate over whether a contention
is a "new rule," once again requiring exces-
sive examination and inefficiency in federal
habeas procedures. In addition, Teague under-
mines the historical development of the writ
of habeas corpus, which, by its very nature,
assumes disruption of conventional notions
of finality. Perhaps Justice Brennan best
summed up the pernicious effect of Teaguein
the final sentence of his dissent, when he
stated that "the plurality would deprive us of
the manifold advantages of deciding impor-
tant constitutional questions when they come
to us first or most cleanly on collateral review.
Lay, supra note 86, at 1042.
256 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
257 Id.
258 Id. at 400.
259 Id. The Court suggested that executive clem-
ency was the appropriate remedy for claims of
innocence like those of Herrera. Id. at 417.
260 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).
261 Andrew H. Malcolm, Tainted Verdicts Resurrect
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262 See infta section II.C.8.
263 See supra section II.C.1. and II.C.2.
264 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. at 404-05.
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(Marshall,J., concurring).
266 Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscar-
riages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN.
L. REv. 21, 36 (1987). See also CHARLES L. BLACK,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CA-
PRICE AND MISTAKE 17-21 (1974). For a more
contemporary account of people wrongfully con-
victed of capital crimes, see RADELET ET AL., IN
SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992) (chronicling the or-
deals of 400 Americans wrongfully convicted of
crimes punishable by death).
267 Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the
Danger of Mistaken Executions, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., Oct. 21, 1993 (identifying as reasons for
wrongful convictions in capital cases racial preju-
dice, the pressure to prosecute, inadequate coun-
sel, and official misconduct) [hereinafter Inno-
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INNOCENT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER (1992) [hereinafter EXECUT-
ING THE INNOCENT].
268 EXECUTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 267, at 2.
For a discussion of recent examples of innocent
people released after serving time on death row,
see infra notes 271-90 and accompanying text.
269 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204
(1971).
270 Death Row Inmate Acquitted at 3rd Trial, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 5, 1995, at 9A.
271 No Fourth Murder Tria4 NAT. L. J., Dec. 25-Jan.
1, 1996, at A8.
272 Brent Whiting & Pamela Manson, 5th Trial
Clears Man in 2 Murders, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 2,
1995, at Al.
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274 Richard L. Fricker, Reasonable Doubts, ABA J.,
Dec. 1993, at 39.
271 State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999, 1003 (Okla. Ct.
Crim. App. 1994) (noting that the State of Okla-
homa unlawfully withheld 165 photographs and
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276 Randall Coyne, Abe Munson's Near-Death Experi-
ence, OKLA. OBSERVER, Apr. 25, 1995, at 9.
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TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at All.
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279 Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 267,
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280 Id. at 7. Unlike most wrongfully condemned
inmates who gain their freedom, Bloodsworth
was awarded $300,000 from the State of Maryland
after Governor William Donald Schaefer par-
doned him. Paul W. Valentine & Richard Tap-
scott, Maryland to Give Cleared Man $300,000,
WASH. POST, June 23, 1994, at B1.
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286 Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 267,
at 8.
287 Id.
288 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).
289 Id. at 1138 n.8 (Blackmun,J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citations omitted). In an
interview with Nina Totenberg of National Public
Radio, broadcast shortly after his Callins dissent
was published, Justice Blackmun addressed the
inevitability of human error and the imperfec-
tions in the criminal justice system. He acknowl-
edged that he believed it possible that, during his
tenure as Justice, "genuinely innocent people"
whose cases came before the Court had been
executed. All Things Considered: Blackmun Dissents
in Death Penalty Case (National Public Radio broad-
cast, Feb. 22, 1994).
290 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (1996)).
291 No fewer than four attorneys general warned
that the habeas corpus provisions of the antiterror-
ism bills were unconstitutional. Letter of Dec. 8,
1995, to President WilliamJ. Clinton, from Benja-
min R. Civiletti,Jr., Edward H. Levi, Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach, and Elliot L. Richardson.
292 L.W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus
Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
293 Id.
294 Id. For an in-depth analysis of the effects of the
Anti-Terrorism Act on existing Supreme Court
precedent, see id.
295 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
96 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
29 7 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
298 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
N9 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
300 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
301 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
302 See generally Yackle, supra note 292.
303 COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 27, at 101
(Supp. 1996-1997); Yackle, supra note 292.
304 Yackle, supra note 292.
305 Previously, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provided that:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal
court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court, a determina-
tion after a hearing on the merits of a factual
issue, made by a State court of competent
jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the
applicant for the writ and the State or an
officer or agent thereof were parties, evi-
denced by a written finding, written opinion,
or other reliable and adequate written indi-
cia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless
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the applicant shall establish or it shall other-
wise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the state court
hearing;
(2) that the fact-finding procedure em-
ployed by the State court was not ad-
equate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately
developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction
of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court pro-
ceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and
the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint
counsel to represent him in the State
court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full,
fair, and adequate hearing in the state
court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied
due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless the part of the record of the
State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was
made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port such factual determination, is pro-
duced as provided for hereinafter, and
the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole
concluded that such factual determina-
tion is not fairly supported by the re-
cord;
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceed-
ing in the Federal court, when due proof of
such factual determination has been made,
unless the evidence of one or more of the
circumstances respectively set forth in para-
graphs number (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown
by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is
admitted by the respondent, or unless the
court concludes pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph numbered (8) that the record
in the State court proceeding, considered as
a whole, does not fairly support such factual
determination, the burden shall rest upon
the applicant to establish by convincing evi-
dence that the factual determination by the
State court was erroneous.
306 This limitation on the power of federal courts
appears to be a clear violation of due process. As
the Supreme Court has observed, the test is
whether a measure "offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Critics of the deference standard have noted that
"[I]ndependent review of state criminal judg-
ments by the Federal courts has existed since the
nation's founding, first by 'writ of error' and since
1867 by writ of habeas corpus." Benjamin R.
Civiletti,Jr. & Eliot Richardson, The Constitution on
Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1996, at A21 (op.
ed. of two former attorneys general).
307 Yackle, supra note 292.
308 Id.
309 See id. The legislation appears to overrule
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
310 As described below, racism is not confined to
the sentencing phase of capital cases, but can and
does pervade every aspect of death penalty cases.
See infra notes 313-65 and accompanying text.
Even today, defense attorneys who depend upon
court appointments for economic survival may
refrain from challenging the systematic exclusion
of blacks from jury service for fear of losing
future appointments. See, e.g., Gates v. Zant, 863
F.2d 1492, 1497-1500 (11th Cir. 1989). Likewise, it
is not at all unusual for white defense attorneys to
use racial slurs when referring to their black
clients. Consider the following opening state-
ment in a capital trial that resulted in a death
sentence:
You have got a little ole nigger man over
there that doesn't weigh over 135 pounds.
He is poor and he is broke. He's got an
appointed lawyer.... He is ignorant. I will
venture to say that he has an IQ of not over
80.
Transcript of Opening and Closing Arguments at
39, State v. Dungee, Record Excerpts at 102 (11th
Cir.) (No. 85-8202), decided sub nom. Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1164 (1986) (cited in Bright, Counsel for
the Poor supra note 117, at 1857).
311 ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (1988).
More recently, in August 1991, the ABA adopted a
resolution in support of mitigating the dispropor-
tionate impacts which then-pending federal death
penalty bills would have on Native Americans.
That resolution provides as follows:
Be It Resolved that the American Bar Associa-
tion, while taking no position on the enact-
ment of general federal death penalty legisla-
tion, supports in principle legislative measures
which would prevent or minimize any dispro-
portionate effects such legislation would have
on Native Americans subject to federal juris-
diction.
ABA, SUMMARY OF AcTION OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, 1989 ANNUAL MEETING (August 1991).
312 DEATH Row USA, supra note 156, at 1.
313 Id.
VOLUME IV, NUMBER 1 (FALL 1996)
314 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).
315 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND,
INC., EXECUTION UPDATE, at 1 (Jan. 27, 1996). See
also SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH
AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING (1989).
316 EXECUTION UPDATE, supra note 315, at 1.
317 CHARLES H. WHITEBRFAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBO-
GIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES
AND CONCEPTS 508 (3d ed. 1993).
318 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
319 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
320 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Charles
Black argues that each step in the criminal justice
system presents an opportunity for the exercise of
broad discretion. CHARLES L. BLACK, CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MIS-
TAKE (2d ed. 1981). In Black's view, arrest, convic-
tion, sentencing, appeal, and the exercise of
clemency are equally subject to the application of
inexact standards of decision-making. The inevi-
table result is a high degree of arbitrariness in the
determination of who is ultimately executed.
Black concludes that the possibility of mistake in
the infliction of the death penalty and the pres-
ence of standardless arbitrariness in its imposi-
tion are ineradicable features of death penalty
administration. Id.
521 Richard Burr, Representing the Client on Death
Row: The Politics of Advocacy, 59 UMKC L. REv. 1
(1990). Similarly, a study of 1017 homicide cases
in Florida concluded that race "functions as an
implicit aggravating factor in homicide cases."
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and
Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 587, 615 (1985).
322 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364-65 (Mar-
shall,J., concurring).
323 See supra notes 357-62 and accompanying text.
324 RonaldJ. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should
the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act be Enacted to
Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capi-
tal Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE
777, 780 (1990-1991) [hereinafter Tabak, Is Rac-
ism Irrelevant?]). For a collection of citations to
many of these studies, see id. at 780 n.9.
325 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87
(1987).
326 The U.S. Supreme Court, which considered
the Baldus study in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 286
(1987), described Baldus' work as "sophisti-
cated." Id. at 291 n.7. A 1990 report of the
General Accounting Office (GAO) referred to
the Baldus study as a "high quality" study. Former
federal prosecutor, U.S. Senator Brock Adams,
called the Baldus study "the most sophisticated
statistical study ever done" on racial discrimina-
tion in capital sentencing. See 136 Cong. Rec.
S6873, 6893 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement
of Senator Adams). The year following the McCles-
key decision, Professor Baldus was appointed by
the New Jersey Supreme Court to review the
effect of racism on that state's capital sentencing
statute. See Order, New Jersey Supreme Court,
July 29, 1988. See also Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?,
supra note 324, at 781 nn. 11-12.
327 David Bruck, Decisions of Death, NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 12, 1983.
328 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 287.
331 DOUBLEJUSTICE: RACE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(Diann Y. Rust-Tierney & Kerima Wicks 1993).
One commentator has attempted to place these
statistics in perspective:
[S]mokers are 1.7 times more likely to die of
coronary artery disease than nonsmokers of
similar ages. Thus, while smoking cigarettes
greatly increases the risk of dying from heart
disease, the impact of smoking is consider-
ably less than the race-of-victim effect on
capital punishment.
Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant ?, supra note 324, at 781.
332 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
s3 In 1978, Warren McCleskey was convicted in
Fulton County, Georgia, of robbing a furniture
store and killing Frank Schlatt, a white police
officer. McCleskey's jury, composed of 11 whites
and one black, sentenced him to life for the
robbery and death for the murder. McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 283-85.
334 481 U.S. at 327 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
335 Id. at 324 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
336 Id. at 292-93. The requirement that McCleskey
show that a particular actor in his case-prosecu-
tor, judge or juror-acted with a discriminatory
purpose is at odds with the historic Furman
decision. In that case, Anthony Amsterdam dem-
onstrated a pattern of arbitrary and capricious
capital sentencing. He was not required to nor
did he show that a particular legislator, prosecu-
tor, judge or juror acted in Furman's case in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). As the McCleskey majority
acknowledged, the Court has accepted statistics
as proof of intent to discriminate in other con-
texts, including a state's selection of the jury
venire and statutory violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 293-94.
331 Id. at 308.
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338 Id. at 312. The Court's decision was "in-
formed" by the recognition that McCleskey's
claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into
serious question the principles that underlie the
criminal justice system. The Eighth Amendment
is not limited to capital cases, but applies to all
other criminal penalties. 481 U.S. at 314-15.
339 Id. at 309.Justice Brennan, dissenting in McCles-
key, commented on the Baldus study's attempts to
quantify the risk of impermissible discrimination
in capital sentencing.
The Baldus study indicates that, after taking
into account some 230 nonracial factors that
might legitimately influence a sentencer, the
jury more likely than not would have spared
McCleskey's life had his victim been black....
Furthermore, even examination of the sen-
tencing system as a whole, factoring in those
cases in which the jury exercises little discre-
tion, indicates the influence of race on capi-
tal sentencing. For the Georgia system as a
whole, race accounts for a six percentage
point difference in the rate at which capital
punishment is imposed. Since death is im-
posed in 11% of all white-victim cases, the
rate in comparably aggravated black-victim
cases is 5%. The rate of capital sentencing in
a white-victim case is thus 120% greater than
the rate in a black-victim case. Put another
way, over half-55%--of defendants in white-
victim crimes in Georgia would not have
been sentenced to die if their victims had
been black. Of the more than 200 variables
potentially relevant to a sentencing decision,
race of the victim is a powerful explanation
for variation in death sentence rates-as
powerful as nonracial aggravating factors
such as a prior murder conviction or acting
as the principal planner of the homicide.
These adjusted figures are only the most
conservative indication of the risk that race
will influence the death sentences of defen-
dants in Georgia. Data unadjusted for the
mitigating or aggravating effect of other
factors show an even more pronounced dis-
parity by race. The capital sentencing rate for
all white-victim cases was almost 11 times
greater than the rate for black-victim cases.
Furthermore, blacks who kill whites are sen-
tenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate of
blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times
the rate of whites who kill blacks. In addition,
prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70%
of black defendants with white victims, but
for only 15% of black defendants with black
victims, and only 19% of white defendants
with black victims. Since our decision uphold-
ing the Georgia capital-sentencing system in
Gregg, the State has executed seven persons.
All of the seven were convicted of killing
whites, and six of the seven executed were
black. Such execution figures are especially
striking in light of the fact that, during the
period encompassed by the Baldus study,
only 9.2% of Georgia homicides involved
black defendants and white victims, while
60.7% involved black victims.
Id. at 325-27 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
For an argument that five of the McCleskey jus-
tices-the four dissenters plus Justice Scalia-
agreed that the Baldus study successfully proved
racial discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminat-
ing Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty:
The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 519, 527-28 (1995).
340 McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279.
34 1 JEFFRIES, supra note 23, at 451.
342 Id.
343 Although Justice Powell confessed his belief
that the death penalty should be abolished in
1991, his change of heart on the issue of capital
punishment was not widely known until the 1994
publication of John C. Jeffries' book, JUSTICE
LEWiS F. POWELLJR., supra note 23.
344 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTYN
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RA-
ciAL DISPARITIES (1990) [hereinafter GAO Re-
port]. Although the GAO considered conducting
its own empirical studies, it decided to perform
"an evaluative synthesis-a review and critique of
existing research." Id. at 1.
345 Id. at 5.
346 Id. at 5. The GAO Report described the stud-
ies' conclusions regarding race-of-defendant dis-
crimination as "equivocal." Id. at 6.
347 Conference, Death Penalty in the Twenty-First
Century, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 238 (1995) [hereinafter
Conference, Death Penalty].
348 Id. at 328.
349 Id. at 347.
350 Id. at 336.
351 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 325.
352 Conference, Death Penalty, supra note 347, at
347.
353 DEATH Row USA, supra note 156, at 8.
354 Id. at 9. Grasso confessed to the murder of
Hilda Johnson, an 87-year-old black woman from
Tulsa. Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1993).
355 Missouri Double-MurdererExecuted, REUTERS LTD.,
Dec. 6, 1995.
356 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
VOLUME IV, NUMBER 1 (FALL 1996)
357 See generally Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of
Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Impositon of
the Death Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 797 (1986); Chemerinsky, supra
note 339.
358 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The
Racial Justice Act would have added to Title 28,
United States Code, a new chapter 177: "Racially
Discriminatory Capital Sentencing."
359 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
360 Conservative commentator George F. Will
claimed that "the real purpose of the [Racial
Justice Act] is to end all executions." George F.
Will, Racial Justice Act is Ploy to Kill Death Penalty,
CHI. SUN TIMES, May 19, 1994, at 31. But, as
Professor Chemerinsky replied:
[T]his is no more true than the contention
that allowing statistical proof of discrimina-
tion in employment cases is meant to end all
hiring. The Racial Justice Act would allow
executions to continue unless the defendant
can prove discrimination, and the court finds
the proof to be statistically significant, and
the prosecutor fails to offer sufficient racially
neutral explanations for the discriminatory
pattern.
Chemerinsky, supra note 339, at 533.
361 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). See
Chemerinsky, supra note 339, at 530.
362 For a discussion ofJustice Blackmun's transfor-
mation in capital cases, see Randall Coyne, Mark-
ing the Progress of a Humane Justice: Harry Black-
mun's Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 KAN. L. REv. 367
(1995).
363 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
364 Id. at 1135-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
365 ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, 1989 MIDYEAR MEETING (Feb. 1989).
366 Id. Additionally, Mental Health Standards pro-
mulgated by the ABA state that an individual
should not be executed if:
[A]s a result of mental illness or mental
retardation,... [the individual] cannot under-
stand the nature of the proceedings, what he
or she was tried for, the reason for the
punishment, or the nature of the punish-
ment [or] lacks sufficient competence to
recognize or understand any fact which might
exist which would make the punishment
unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to
convey such information to counsel or to the
court.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS
§ 7-5.6(b) (1983) (emphasis added).
The ABA Resolutions and Mental Health Stan-
dards that address mental retardation are based
on a definition that describes "mentally retarded
persons" as having "significantly subaverage gen-
eral intellectual functioning existing concur-
rently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the development period."
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY
(now Retardation), CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RE-
TARDATION 1 (H. Grossman ed. 1983). According
to Professor James Ellis, a leading expert on
mental retardation, all 12 jurisdictions that pro-
hibit the execution of mentally retarded persons
utilize this definition. Telephone Interview with
James Ellis, Professor of Law, University of New
Mexico School of Law (Feb. 10, 1997) (memoran-
dum on file with the Georgetown Journal on Fighting
Poverty).
In 1992, the American Association of Mental
Retardation adopted a revised definition of "men-
tally retarded person." The 1992 definition pro-
vides:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limi-
tations in present functioning. It is character-
ized by significantly sub-average intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with re-
lated limitations in two or more of the
following applicable adaptive skill areas: com-
munication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health
and safety, functional academics, leisure, and
work. Mental retardation manifests before
age 18.
Susan Lee, Note and Comment, Heller v. Dee:
Involuntary Civil Commitment and the "Objective"
Language of Probability, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 457,
460 (1994).
367 Telephone Interview with James Ellis, Profes-
sor of Law, University of New Mexico School of
Law (Feb. 10, 1997) (memorandum on file with
the Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty). Ellis
reports that 11 death penalty states, plus the
federal government, prohibit the execution of
mentally retarded persons. However, of the states
with the largest death row populations and high-
est execution rates, only Georgia has a statute that
exempts mentally retarded persons from capital
punishment. Id.
368 EMILY V. REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETAR-
DATION 39 (1993). See a/soJamie M. Billotte, Is It
Justified?-The Death Penalty and Mental Retarda-
tion, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 333,
337 (1994);John H. Blume, Representing the Men-
tally Retarded Defendant, CHAMPION, Nov. 1987, at
32 (estimating that, in 1987, 250 mentally re-
tarded people were on death row in the United
States).
369 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 307.
373 Id. at 308-09. Penry testified in his own de-
fense. Although he initially appeared intelligent
and knowledgeable, defense questioning re-
vealed that he could not read or write, did not
know how many nickels are in a dime, could not
name the days of the week or the months of the
year, was unable to count to 100, and did not
know who was President of the United States.
Virginia Ellis & Dale Rice, Retarded and Sentenced to
Die, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Sept. 11, 1988.
374 492 U.S. at 318.
375 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071 (c)-(e)
(West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
376 492 U.S. at 323.
377 Id. at 324.
378 Id. at 326.
379 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).
380 SeeJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
381 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37-071 (c)-(e)
(West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
382 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1134 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).Justice Blackmun did not write separately in
Penry. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1988).
Instead, he joined portions ofJustice O'Connor's
opinion of the Court. Specifically, Justice Black-
mun joined with Justices O'Connor, Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens to hold that Penry's argu-
ment-that his jury was unable to fully consider
and give effect to mitigating evidence of his
mental retardation and abused background in
answering Texas' three special issues-sought a
result dictated by Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976) (upholding Texas' death penalty statute
in the face of a constitutional challenge). Conse-
quently, Penry was not seeking a "new rule"
which, under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),
would not be cognizable in federal habeas cor-
pus. Under Teague, "new rules" may not generally
be applied or announced in cases on collateral
review. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Justice Blackmun
alsojoined the entirety ofJustice Stevens' opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 492
U.S. at 349. These two justices agreed that the
Court should not apply Teague's nonretroactivity
principles to capital cases without the benefit of
briefing and oral argument. Id. Moreover, even if
Teague were held to apply to capital cases, Justices
Stevens and Blackmun agreed that an exception
to the retroactivity doctrine applied. In their view,
rules prohibiting a certain category of punish-
ment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense are excepted from Teague's
draconian doctrine. Id. Justice Brennan's opin-
ion,joined byJustice Marshall, suggested that the
execution of mentally retarded offenders was
always unconstitutional. Id. at 341. Thus, Justice
Blackmun and three others (Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens) concluded that executing mentally
retarded persons is unconstitutional. A bare ma-
jority (Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, White
and Kennedy) held otherwise.
For an excellent discussion of the paradox cre-
ated by Furman's promise of consistency and
Lockett's requirement of individualized sentenc-
ing, see Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:
Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitiga-
tion in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147
(1991).
383 Consider the following account from a local
newspaper in South Carolina:
Down in Conway, a circuit judge has handed
down a no-nonsense decision upholding law
and order.... The case involves convicted
killer Limmie Arthur, 28, who has the social
intelligence of a 10- to 12-year-old and the
mental ability of a 7-year-old. This was enough
sense to enable him to kill William "Cripple
Jack" Miller in 1984.... It appears to us that
there is all the more reason to execute a
killer if he is also insane or retarded. Killers
often kill again; an insane or retarded killer
is more to be feared than a sane or normal
killer. There is also far less possibility of his
ever becoming a useful citizen.
Upholding Law and Order, HARTSVILLE MESSENGER,
June 24, 1987, at 5B, col. 1. See generally John
Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally
Retarded to Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41
ARK. L. REV. 725 (1988).
384 Earl Washington, a mentally retarded black
man from Virginia, fit this profile perfectly. In
1982, Rebecca Lynn Williams was raped and
murdered in Culpepper, Virginia. One year later,
Washington was arrested in Warrenton, twenty
miles away, for assaulting his brother-in-law. Wash-
ington, who had an IQ of 69, had been up all
night drinking, and was interrogated for two days.
Although the assault charges were dropped, dur-
ing this interrogation, Washington confessed to a
variety of other crimes, including the rape of a
Warrenton woman. Officials investigated each of
these crimes and concluded that Washington
could not have committed them.
Because he believed that Washington was keeping
something from him, an officer asked: "Earl, did
you kill that girl in Culpeper? ... I mean the
woman you stabbed in Culpeper?" Washington
"shook his head yes and started crying." Washing-
ton never mentioned rape.
As Washington volunteered certain "facts" about
VOLUME IV, NUMBER 1 (FALL 1996)
the crime, he was repeatedly corrected. For ex-
ample, Washington said that Ms. Williams was
black. She was white. Although Washington said
his victim was "kind of short," Ms. Williams was
5'8" tall. Washington claimed that he gained
entry by kicking in a door, but the door was not
damaged. Washington said he had stabbed her
between one and three times. Ms. Williams had
38 stab wounds. Washington claimed that the
victim was alone, but police who arrived shortly
after the murder found a baby in a playpen and
Ms. Williams' three-year-old daughter. Officers
drove Washington by the crime scene three times.
Twice he failed to identify it. The third time, an
officer asked, "Earl, isn't this the place?" and
Washington said yes.. Although numerous finger-
prints were found in the victim's home, none
matched Washington's.
Washington's trial attorney received no psychiat-
ric or psychological assistance in preparing Wash-
ington's defense. Washington was sent to the state
mental hospital, which certified his competence
both to stand trial and to waive his Miranda
warnings. Soon thereafter, Washington was con-
victed and sentenced to die.
Years later, Washington's post-conviction lawyers
tested semen stains on the bedding where the
rape took place and seminal fluid recovered from
the victim. The tests excluded Washington as the
rapist. ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE? 54-56
(1991). Ultimately, after much media attention
and political pressure, the governor of Virginia
commuted Washington's death sentence to life.
Peter Baker, DNA Test to Free Man Imprisoned in
Virginia Rape, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994, at Al.
385John Brummett, The Fairchild Issue Won't Die,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZErE, Aug. 29, 1995, at 7B.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1431
(E.D. Ark. 1989).
389 Id. at 1461. The state's psychological examiner
used a revision of the antiquated Beta examina-
tion, and claimed that Fairchild's IQ was actually
87. The Beta is a picture test used for World War I
draftees who were unable to read or write. PERSKE,
supra note 384, at 102.
390 Fairchild, 900 F.2d at 1295.
391 Murderer Executed in Arkansas, CHARLESTON GA-
ZETrE, Sept. 1, 1995, at 5B.
392 Id.
393 DEATH Row USA, supra note 156, at 9.
39 4 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY 82 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter THE DEATH PENALTY].
395 Id.
396 Id. at 82-83. In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled
that states must provide indigent defendants with
psychiatric assistance in cases where sanity is an
issue. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
197 THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 394, at 82-83.
398 DEATH Row USA, supra note 156, at 4.
399 PERSKE, supra note 384, at 28.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Id. at 29. At trial, Bowden testified that he told
the police that he did not participate in the
crime. Also, he swore that he agreed to sign the
confession, which he could neither read nor
understand, only after a detective told him that
he would not be sentenced to death if he signed
it. Id.
403 Id. at 28.
404 Id. at 32.
405 Id.
406 DEATH Row USA, supa note 156, at 5. Strong
public reaction to Bowden's execution culmi-
nated on April 8, 1988, when Georgia Governor
Joe Frank Harris signed a bill that banned the
execution of persons with mental retardation. Of
the states with the largest death row populations
and highest execution rates, Georgia alone has
such a statute. Id.
407 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-7, Marquez
v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 215 (1994).
Trial counsel did not present any of this
information to the jury. . .. In the state
habeas corpus hearing, trial counsel ex-
plained that, as they understood the Texas
capital sentencing statute and the case law
governing its application at the time of trial,
the type of evidence set forth above could
not be considered by the jury as a basis for a
sentence less than death, and instead, could
only be considered as aggravating evidence
under Texas special issue number two to aid
the state in providing its case for a death
sentence.
Id.
40s Id. at 6. Since his infancy, this torture was a
daily experience.
4o Id. at 7 n.4. Mario was forced to care for his
siblings for one year.
410 Id. (citing State Court Finding of Fact 1, Claim
I).
411 Id. at 6. Mario was singled out for his father's
wrath because he was "slower" than his other
fifteen siblings. Id.
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412 Id. at 6 (citing State Court Finding of Fact No.
1, Claim 1).
413 Jonathan Freedland, Eyes Right: More and More,
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